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ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM
INFRINGEMENT OF FEDERAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Peter S. Menell*
The federal intellectual property system serves as a principal
means of promoting "progress in Science and useful Arts"1 through
the provision of limited monopolies to authors and inventors. By this
logic, enhancing the scope or enforceability of intellectual property
rights increases the expected reward to those engaged in intellectual
work, thereby spurring intellectual creativity and the exploitation of
works. Inversely, impediments to the enforcement of the intellectual
property rights or limitations on remedies reduce this reward stream
and opportunity for exploitation, thereby dampening the incentives
of those who engage in creative enterprise.
During the 1980s, intellectual property owners became con-
cerned that a significant class of consumers of intellectual property-
the fifty states and their myriad agencies and institutions, including
public universities-might escape or at least frustrate enforcement of
federal intellectual property rights by invoking state sovereign im-
munity under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.2 In
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, and Director,
Berkeley Center for Law and Technology. I am grateful to Fred Abbot, Tho-
mas Cotter, John Dwyer, Lauren Edelman, Willy Fletcher, Paul Heald, Justin
Hughes, Dan Meltzer, Rob Merges, Jennifer Poise, Marty Simpson, Simon
Steel, Claire Sylvia, Eugene Volokh, and John Yoo for helpful discussions and
to Pratik Shah for research assistance.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend XI. The Supreme Court has interpreted
this Amendment as prohibiting all suits by individuals against nonconsenting
states in federal court, not only Article III diversity actions. See Hans v. Lou-
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1985, the Supreme Court held that Congress must "mak[e] its inten-
tion unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity.3 Three years later, the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed a decision dismissing a patent infringement action
brought against the State of California on the grounds that California
had not consented to jurisdiction and the Patent Act did not contain
an unmistakably clear statement that Congress intended to abrogate
state sovereign immunity.4 In response, Congress enacted a series of
laws expressly abrogating state sovereign immunity for copyright,
5
trademark,6 and patent infringement. In 1996, the Supreme Court in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida8 raised the bar another notch in holding
that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity when leg-
islating pursuant to its Article I powers. The Court noted,9 however,
that Congress retains authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment remedial powers to "enforce,
isiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13, 15 (1890). See generally Patent Remedy Clarification
Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886 before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop-
erty, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Hearings before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights
and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); A Report of the Register of Copyrights, Copyright Li-
ability of States and the Eleventh Amendment (June 1988).
3. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
4. See Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding the
dismissal of a patent infringement claim against a state on the ground that the
Patent Act did not contain a clear statement that Congress intended to subject
states to infingement liability); see also Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871 F.2d
166 (1st Cir. 1989) (dismissing copyright action against state entity on sover-
eign immunity grounds); BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988)
(same); Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir.
1988) (same).
5. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat.
2749 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 511 (1994)).
6. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat.
3567 (1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998)).
7. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L.
No. 102-560, § 2(a)(2), 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296
(1994)).
8. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
9. See id. at 71 n.15.
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by appropriate legislation,"'10 that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'
i I
At the close of its 1998 Term, the Supreme Court, in Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank,12 struck down the Patent and Plant Variety Remedy Clarifica-
tion Act on the grounds that Congress cannot abrogate state sover-
eign immunity on the basis of Article I powers and that Congress had
not established an adequate basis for abrogation of state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Supreme
Court's view, the legislative record on which Congress based the
Patent Remedy Clarification Act established neither a "pattern of
patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional
violations," nor the lack of adequate state remedies sufficient to jus-
tify remedial measures for violations of due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 13 In a companion case, College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,
14
the Supreme Court struck down aspects of the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act relating to false advertising claims on the ground
that such violations do not intrude upon a constitutionally recognized
"property right" and therefore Congress lacked power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity with
regard to such claims. As a result, the Court never reached the deci-
sive question in Florida Prepaid of whether the abrogation of state
sovereign immunity was necessary to prevent violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 15 The Fifth Circuit has now completed the tril-
ogy, striking down the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act as
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
11. Id. § 1.
12. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
13. Id. at 2207-10.
14. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
15. In College Savings Bank, the Supreme Court also rejected the argument
that the State of Florida had voluntarily waived its sovereign immunity by en-
gaging in "otherwise lawful activity" such as interstate commerce, overruling
its decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway ofAlabama Docks Department, 377
U.S. 184 (1964). College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228-31. The Court
confirmed, however, that Congress may compel a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity where a state receives a "gift or gratuity" or "federal beneficence" that
Congress may rightfully withhold. Id. at 2231.
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beyond congressional power as delimited by the Supreme Court's
Florida Prepaid decisions.16
In relying upon its prior ruling in Seminole Tribe that Congress
may not abrogate state sovereign immunity under its Article I pow-
ers, and by narrowly interpreting Congress's remedial powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court largely sidestepped
the broader implications of its decision for federal intellectual prop-
erty policy. This Article examines the effects of the constitutional
constraints on federal abrogation of state sovereign immunity upon
the incentives of inventors and creators of expressive works as well
as the intellectual property system in general. 17 The Article looks in
turn at the likely effects on state infringement of intellectual property
rights in the United States, the viability of alternative means of pro-
tecting federal intellectual property rights, and potential implications
of the decisions for international intellectual property diplomacy. It
concludes that although state sovereign immunity for violations of
federal intellectual property rights is unlikely to significantly under-
mine the rights of intellectual property owners because of a broad ar-
ray of legal, market, social, and political restraints upon states and
state actors, state sovereign immunity could undermine international
treaty obligations and foreign diplomacy. These latter concerns
16. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir. 2000)
(affirming district court decision to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion based on Florida Prepaid); see also Rodriguez v. Texas Comm'n on the
Arts, 199 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (same). But cf. Peter Bray, After College
Savings v. Florida Prepaid, Are States Subject to Suit for Copyright Infringe-
ment? The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act and Chavez v. Arte Publico
Press, 36 Hous. L. REV. 1531 (1999) (arguing that the legislative basis for ab-
rogating state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement may be more
justifiable under the Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment standard on the
ground that the legislative record on which the Copyright Remedy Clarifica-
tion Act was based contained significant substantiation of pervasive and inten-
tional copyright infringement by state entities).
17. The Supreme Court's rulings do not wholly divorce sovereign immu-
nity from concerns about the integrity of the federal intellectual property sys-
tem. The Court left open the possibility that Congress could, upon a greater
showing of pervasive intellectual property infringement by states and the lack
of adequate state remedies, abrogate state sovereign immunity to remedy vio-
lations of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at
2209-10. The effect of the decisions is to impose upon Congress a relatively
high burden of proof.
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potentially provide an alternative basis for congressional abrogation
of state sovereign immunity for infringement of federal intellectual
property rights.
1. INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON STATE INFRINGEMENT OF
FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
At first blush, the Supreme Court's Florida Prepaid decisions
appear to afford states and state entities some enticing options for re-
ducing the costs of providing services to their constituents. State of-
fices could free up resources by purchasing just one copy of com-
puter programs and making copies for all of their employees. Public
schools could ease budgetary pressures while raising teacher salaries
and expanding programs by setting up government-operated printing
operations to reproduce textbooks for all students in the state. State
universities could reduce their costs of operating laboratories and
other research facilities by using patented products and processes in
their laboratories without paying royalties. State hospitals could sig-
nificantly reduce the costs of providing care by manufacturing pat-
ented drugs.
While these opportunities have obvious appeal, especially to
state governments and institutions seeking to keep taxes and tuition
low and services high, it is unlikely that states will change their poli-
cies regarding compliance with federal intellectual property laws
following the Florida Prepaid decisions. Notwithstanding the Su-
preme Court's expansive view of state sovereign immunity and the
constitutional limitations upon Congress's ability to abrogate such
immunity, legal, market, social, and political constraints will likely
dissuade states from either adopting policies to infringe federal in-
tellectual property rights or allowing state entities to engage in wide-
spread or systematic infringement of federal intellectual property
rights.1
8
18. See generally JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW
AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998) (laying
out a general multi-institutional framework for understanding governance of
resources).
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A. Legal Constraints on Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights
by States
The Supreme Court's Florida Prepaid decisions do not fore-
close intellectual property owners from seeking legal recourse for in-
fringement of their intellectual property rights by states and state of-
ficials, although full enforcement of federal intellectual property
rights will undoubtedly be more costly, time-consuming, and com-
plicated. Intellectual property owners may still obtain injunctive re-
lief against state actors in federal court to prevent violations of their
rights. Although they cannot directly obtain damages for infringe-
ment from states, they may nonetheless be able to obtain comparable
relief through actions against state officials in their individual capac-
ity and through inverse condemnation actions under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Furthermore, they can seek recourse within the state
court system under various theories. The availability and nature of
relief, however, will depend upon additional circumstances beyond
those involved in traditional intellectual property enforcement ac-
tions.
1. Federal causes of action
Intellectual property owners may still bring federal actions
against municipalities and state and municipal employees in their in-
dividual capacity. Under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 19 owners
may still be able to obtain injunctive relief against state officials who
infringe federal intellectual property rights. The Eleventh Amend-
ment bars intellectual property owners from obtaining direct retro-
spective monetary relief from states in federal court, but comparable
relief may be available through actions pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment for inverse condemnation of federal intellectual prop-
erty rights. In addition, intellectual property owners might be able to
obtain attorney fees in federal actions by asserting § 1983 claims.
a. federal intellectual property claims
In understanding the effect of the Florida Prepaid decisions, it
is important to distinguish among the range of public bodies and em-
ployees within the states for purposes of applying Eleventh
19. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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Amendment sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has long held
that municipalities, while public, are not state entities within the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. 20 Therefore, intellectual prop-
erty owners may sue municipalities and municipal workers in state
court without regard to the Florida Prepaid decisions. Thus, many
public entities within the states-including cities, school boards,
public utilities, regional transportation authorities, county hospitals,
and some community colleges-remain subject to suit in federal
court for violations of the intellectual property laws.
Following the Florida Prepaid decisions, there may be more
disputes as to whether a hybrid entity "is to be treated as an arm of
the State partaking of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, or
instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or other political
subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not extend.'
In making this determination, courts examine a range of factors in-
cluding how the entity is treated under state law, the entity's sources
of funding, the nature of the governmental function performed, and
the extent to which the entity is subject to state control.
22
If a state entity infringes federal intellectual property rights, the
intellectual property owner may nevertheless bring an enforcement
action in federal court to enjoin such infringement by the state entity
or official. The key in doing so is to lodge the action against the re-
sponsible state official in his or her official capacity. In Ex parte
Young, the Supreme Court held that "'a suit against individuals for
the purpose of preventing them as officers of a State from enforcing
an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the rights of the plain-
tiff, is not a suit against the State within the meaning of [the Elev-
enth] Amendment."'' 23 The doctrine of Ex parte Young applies to
20. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 56 n.20 (1990) (holding that
school boards are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment); Monell v. De-
partment of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). The District of Columbia is treated as a
municipality. See Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159, 162 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
21. Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977).
22. See generally MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION
1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 180-87 (3d ed. 1997) (summarizing
cases applying this analysis).
23. 209 U.S. at 154 (quoting Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898)).
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some state violations of federal law, whether or not the state violates
constitutional rights.24
The Exparte Young doctrine, however, is subject to a number of
limitations. A plaintiff must normally exhaust state "legislative" and
"administrative" remedies before seeking relief in federal court,25
although the plaintiff need not exhaust state "judicial" remedies.
26
Furthermore, the Ex parte Young doctrine does not extend to retro-
spective financial liability.27 Therefore, intellectual property owners
cannot obtain monetary relief directly from the state.28 In addition,
states may use the power of eminent domain to effectuate a taking of
intellectual property rights.29 In such a case, the intellectual property
owner will not be able to obtain injunctive relief, but would be enti-
tled to "just compensation." Such compensation could, however, be
less than what the intellectual property owner would be entitled to in
a traditional infringement action.30 In addition, the Supreme Court
ruled that injunctive relief under the Ex parte Young doctrine is not
available to enforce federal statutes that contain comprehensive en-
forcement mechanisms inconsistent with an injunctive remedy in
federal court.31 This narrowing of the Ex parte Young doctrine
See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.5.1 (3d ed.
1999) (discussing Ex parte Young doctrine).
24. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 23, § 7.5.1, at 413, § 7.5.2, at 429.
25. See Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159, 208-09
(1929).
26. See City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934). See
generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 312-13 (5th ed.
1994) (discussing exhaustion of state remedies).
27. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
28. Damages can be sought from the state officer in his or her individual
capacity for past harms, regardless of whether the state has an indemnification
policy. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Foulks v. Ohio
Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 713 F.2d 1229, 1233 (6th Cir. 1983).
29. Cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). The Court in
Ruckelshaus commented that injunctive relief "is not available to enjoin an al-
leged taking of private property for public use, duly authorized by law, when a
suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to the
taking." Id. at 1016. The intellectual property owner would have to pursue an
inverse condemnation claim. In any case, however, the intellectual property
owner would have some recourse.
30. See infra Part I.A.2.a.
31. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996). See generally
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup.
1406 [Vol. 33:1399
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should not prevent intellectual property owners from pursuing in-
junctive relief against states to prevent infringement of their rights.
It can be argued that Congress clearly intended that such relief
should be available against states. Furthermore, Congress can clarify
this intent through new legislation.
The Florida Prepaid decisions will have their most significant
effect with regard to efforts by intellectual property owners to obtain
monetary relief for past infringement by state entities in actions
brought pursuant to the federal intellectual property statutes. None-
theless, intellectual property owners may be able to proceed directly
against state officials in their individual capacity. 32 Federal copy-
right, patent, and trademark law expressly authorize lawsuits against
"any person" who violates these respective regimes. The Florida
Prepaid decisions do not appear to prevent intellectual property
owners from proceeding directly against state officials and employ-
ees in their individual capacities for violating federal intellectual
property rights.
For example, if the office manager of a state agency copies and
distributes copyrighted word-processing software among all of the
employees in his division, then the intellectual property owner could
sue the office manager directly for infringement remedies, including
monetary damages. The principal difference between this lawsuit
and a lawsuit against an office manager for a private company who
engages in the same conduct is that the state employee could try to
invoke qualified immunity. Public employees "generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." 33  While some
copying of copyrighted material might fall within the scope of this
immunity, such as copying for research or educational purposes,
34
CT. REv., 1, 36-48.
32. See, e.g., Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 122
(4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a state actor could be sued in her individual ca-
pacity for past damages under the Copyright Act).
33. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). See Lane v. First Na-
tional Bank, 687 F. Supp. 11, 15-17 (D. Mass. 1988) (considering claim of
qualified immunity in an infringement action against state employee's in their
individual capacities).
34. These activities might be justified under the fair use exception to the
Copyright Act. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
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outright reproduction of entire software programs would likely be
outside of qualified immunity. Furthermore, the intellectual property
owner can diminish the scope of this immunity by sending a cease
and desist demand that puts the alleged infringer on notice of the
rights infringed.
More significantly, in the only appellate case to have considered
qualified immunity of state employees for infringement of federal
intellectual property rights, the Fourth Circuit found the defense in-
applicable. In Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown,35 a photog-
rapher sued a state university, its governing board, and its public re-
lations director for infringing his copyrighted photographs. While
dismissing the actions against the state university and its employees
in their official capacity under the Eleventh Amendment, the Fourth
Circuit allowed the suit against the public relations director in her in-
dividual capacity to go forward. The court rejected a qualified im-
munity defense on the ground that the Supremacy Clause precludes
states from diminishing the scope of protection for works protected
by federal copyright law and therefore overrides any state authorized
immunity afforded to state employees. 36 This reasoning has been
adopted in the only subsequently reported case addressing qualified
immunity for state employee infringement of federal intellectual
property rights.
37
The fact that state governments require or authorize indemnifi-
cation of state employees for some forms of liability attributable to
accidents and other exposures arising from conduct within the course
and scope of their employment 38 does not bring such awards within
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment. Even though such indemnifi-
cation is paid out of state funds, the Supreme Court does not view
such payments as violating the Eleventh Amendment.
39
(multifactor test).
35. 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
36. See id. at 122-23.
37. See Kersavage v. University of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1330-32
(E.D. Tenn. 1989).
38. See generally 1 JON L. CRAIG, CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 3.20, at 248-53 (2d ed. 1992) (collecting indemnifica-
tion provisions of 36 states).
39. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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It is also possible that private actors will be able to obtain de-
claratory relief in federal court against states threatening to enforce
state-owned intellectual property rights. Federal law allows a person
to seek declaratory relief in federal court regarding the validity or en-
forceability of a U.S. patent if the patent owner had caused a reason-
able apprehension that an infringement claim will be lodged against
that person and that person has a sufficient interest at stake with re-
gard to the patent.4 0 Thus, a company that receives a cease and de-
sist letter from a patent owner threatening an infringement action
against the company may seek a declaratory judgment that the patent
in question is either invalid or not infringed by the company's activi-
ties.41 The ability to bring such declaratory judgment actions can be
of significant importance in exercising rights in the marketplace and
pursuing a business strategy. For example, the cloud of infringement
liability can greatly undermine a company's ability to raise money or
introduce new products in the marketplace.
The Supreme Court's Florida Prepaid decisions do not directly
address whether states can be sued in federal court for declaratory
relief. College Savings Bank confirms, however, that Congress may
compel a waiver of sovereign immunity where a state receives a "gift
or gratuity" or "federal beneficence" that Congress may rightfully
withhold.42 One district court has interpreted this language as sup-
porting declaratory judgment actions for patent invalidity against
states in federal court.
43
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court views patents as fal-
ling within the categories of gifts, gratuities, or beneficence for
which Congress may compel waiver. On the day following the issu-
ance of the Florida Prepaid decisions, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of College Savings Bank a
decision by the Federal Circuit holding that the University of Cali-
fornia had consented to declaratory judgment actions by obtaining
40. See Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
41. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 888 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
42. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,2231 (1999).
43. See New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp.
2d 1240, 1243-45 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (rejecting Regents' motion to dismiss de-
claratory judgment action on grounds of sovereign immunity).
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patents-that by their nature can be adjudicated only in federal
court-and threatening enforcement actions in federal court. 44 The
basis for federal jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions
against states is strong. The Eleventh Amendment should not pro-
vide states preferential treatment in exercising rights under federal
intellectual property law.
b. inverse condemnation claims
Even though the Eleventh Amendment shields states from direct
liability for infringement of federal intellectual property rights, in-
tellectual property owners may nonetheless obtain "just compensa-
tion" for the taking of their property under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.45 Because of the availability of direct infringement
actions against states prior to the Florida Prepaid decisions (and the
paucity of reported incidents of infringements by states), no court has
yet applied takings analysis directly to state infringement of intel-
lectual property rights.46 The law is clear, however, that the Takings
Clause applies to intangible as well as tangible forms of property.
44. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Genentech, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999)
(remanding Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446,
1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
45. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1994); Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (ap-
plying the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
46. This issue has not arisen with regard to federal government infringe-
ment of patents and copyrights because Congress has, since 1910, authorized
intellectual property owners to sue the federal government to recover for use of
intellectual property. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498. This section has been interpreted
as a form of eminent domain, see Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F.
Supp. 633, 635 (Ct. Cl. 1950), under which the federal government may con-
demn a license for the shorter of the period of infringing use or the life of the
intellectual property right. See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765,
768 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1114 (Ct. Cl.
1977). Courts interpret this provision as equating infringement with "an emi-
nent domain taking." Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 346 (Ct.
Cl. 1977). The federal government formally waived its immunity from Lan-
ham Act infringement in 1999, see Pub. L. No. 106-43, § 4, 113 Stat. 218
(Aug. 5, 1999), although courts had previously held that the Federal Torts
Claims Act waived such immunity for trademark infringement. See generally
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25:63, at 25-124 (1999).
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The Supreme Court held, more than 150 years ago, that Vermont
could validly take a franchise to a toll bridge crossing and convert it
into a free public road upon payment of compensation to the owner
of the franchise.47 More recently, the Supreme Court has held that
interest on a bank account constitutes property under the Takings
Clause.48 The Supreme Court has recognized that patents, 49 trade se-
crets,50 and trademarks 51 constitute property within the meaning of
the Takings Clause, emphasizing the right to exclude as the "hall-
,,52mark of a protected property interest. This same reasoning would
bring copyrights within the class of property rights protected by the
47. See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (6 How.) (1848).
48. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
49. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945)
("That a patent is property, protected against appropriation both by individuals
and by government, has long been settled." (footnote omitted)); James v.
Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881) (analogizing a utility patent to a land
patent for takings analysis).
50. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
51. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) ("The right to adopt and
use a symbol... to the exclusion of use by all other persons ... is a property
right for the violation of which damages may be recovered in an action at
law.") In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, Justice Scalia commented that:
The Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect constitu-
tionally cognizable property interests-notably, its provisions dealing
with infringement of trademarks, which are the "property" of the
owner because he can exclude others from using them. See, e.g., K
mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185-86, 108 S. Ct. 950, 99 L.
Ed. 2d 151 (1988) ("Trademark law, like contract law, confers private
rights, which are themselves rights of exclusion. It grants the trade-
mark owner a bundle of such rights").
119 S. Ct. at 2224. He went on to note that the Lanham Act's rights against
false advertising are not rights to exclude and therefore do not constitute prop-
erty rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 2224-25.
52. Id. at 2224. See generally Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter,
When the State Steals Ideas: Is the Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity
from Federal Infringement Claims Constitutional in Light of Seminole Tribe?,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1480-81 (1999); Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal
Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV.
529 (1998); Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappro-
priation of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before
and After Seminal Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doc-
trines, 55 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 849, 857-64 (1998).
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Takings Clause.5 3 Therefore, there is a reasonable basis for asserting
that state infringement of intellectual property rights would constitute
a compensable taking.
Intellectual property owners will, however, encounter substan-
tial hurdles in pursuing takings claims against states in federal court.
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank,5 4 the Supreme Court held that a takings claim brought in fed-
eral court against a local planning authority would not be ripe for
federal adjudication until the property owner had obtained a final de-
cision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance to his prop-
erty and had sought compensation through state procedures.
55 Prop-
erty owners may, however, pursue a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of state action without exhausting state remedies.
5 6
Since the infringement of intellectual property rights by a state will
generally not be accomplished through a state statute and in any case
will generally turn on factual questions, this exception to the Wil-
liamson ripeness rule will rarely if ever apply in this context.
The resolution of the takings claim at the state level may have
the practical effect of barring the federal proceeding under principles
of res judicata (claim preclusion), collateral estoppel (issue preclu-
sion), and affording full faith and credit to decisions of competent
courts.5 7 Intellectual property owners will get their day in court to
53. See Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 52, at 1480-81 (noting that "the tra-
ditional view of property likely encompasses rights against patent, copyright,
and trademark infringement").
54. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
55. See id. at 186. Some courts have held that a federal takings suit is not
ripe until the claimant has exhausted state appellate review as well. See, e.g.,
Belvedere Military Corp. v. County of Palm Beach, 845 F. Supp. 877, 878
(S.D. Fla. 1994).
The Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733-34, however, suggests that the Williamson
ripeness requirement is only prudential. If this dictum does bring Williamson
outside of Article III, then Congress could presumably eliminate such a re-
quirement. See Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 52, at 1470-71 n.217.
56. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992).
57. See Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 142 F.3d
1319, 1319, 1325 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998) (expressing "concern that Williamson's
ripeness requirement may, in actuality, almost always result in preclusion of
federal claims"); see also 144 CONG. REc. S8,024 (1998) (citing study by law
firm of Linowes and Blocker L.L.P., Silver Spring, Md., finding that federal
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pursue takings or inverse condemnation claims against states, but it
will not likely be in a federal district court. Decisions of a state's
highest court reviewing a takings claims would, however, be appeal-
able to the U.S. Supreme Court. As a result of these ripeness and
preclusion doctrines, intellectual property owners will need to navi-
gate state administrative and judicial processes in order to obtain
damages (or "just compensation") for infringement of federal intel-
lectual property rights directly from states.
2. State causes of action
In addition to these bases for federal jurisdiction, intellectual
property owners whose rights are violated by states or state actors
may potentially pursue a variety of remedies in state courts and
through state administrative processes where states have authorized
suits or other remedies. These avenues of recourse are generally in-
ferior to federal relief under the intellectual property statutes and
hence there was little incentive for intellectual property owners to
pursue these remedies for state infringement of federal intellectual
property rights prior to the Florida Prepaid decisions. The closing
of the federal courthouses to traditional infringement actions directly
against states will undoubtedly encourage intellectual property own-
ers to pursue creative, and in some circumstances largely untested,
approaches to enforcement of intellectual property rights against
states and state actors in state courts and administrative tribunals.
Unlike federal remedies, however, these modes of legal recourse
vary across jurisdictions. This was one of the principal motivations
and justifications for enacting the federal remedy clarification acts.
58
district courts dismissed more than 80% of takings claims on ripeness grounds
between 1990 and 1997); JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL POWERS § 10.05[A] (1999 &
Supp. 2000); G. Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Takings Clause: A
Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid
Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 91, 91 n.3 (1994)
(reporting that only 5.6% of land-use cases filed in federal court between 1983
and 1988 were ripe); Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in
the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1, 92-97 (1995). Such preclusion might
not apply in some circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGEMENTS §§ 26, 28.
58. See Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the
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a. inverse condemnation claims
Intellectual property owners can invoke state inverse condem-
nation procedures in order to pursue compensation for the infringe-
ment of their intellectual property rights by the state. All states af-
ford protection against governmental takings of private property
without due process or compensation through their own laws. The
constitutions of most states have analogs to the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause,5 9 and many states have enacted specific statutes set-
ting forth procedures for pursuing inverse condemnation actions.
60
Since the actual appropriation of Froperty for public use is consid-
ered an act of eminent domain, an intellectual property owner
would be able to claim that infringement of their intellectual property
rights by the state triggers an obligation to provide compensation.
As noted by the Supreme Court in Florida Prepaid,62 the Florida Su-
preme Court has ruled that intellectual property owners may pursue
an inverse condemnation action where the state infringes federal in-
tellectual property rights.
63
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 34, 41 (1990) (testimony of Pro-
fessor Robert P. Merges) (noting that variation among state law procedures and
remedies could discourage enforcement of rights and undermine a nationally
uniform system of intellectual property rights).
59. See 1 JULIUS SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3 (rev. 3d
ed. 1998) (noting that North Carolina is the only state lacking such a provi-
sion).
60. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-972 (West 2000); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 1250.110, 1268.350 (West 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-56-
116 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-17b (West 2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 95, § 9504 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 113-4 (1999); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 40A-51 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 20.085 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 512 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-187 (Michie 1999); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 1-26-516 (Michie 2000). Some states offer a separate administrative
remedy for recovering from the state.
61. See 1 SACKMAN, supra note 56, § 1.42[1].
62. See 119 S. Ct. at 2209 n.9.
63. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Department of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333,
1336 (Fla. 1993); see also Wilcox Indus., Inc. v. State, 607 N.E.2d 514, 515
(Ohio 1992) (concluding that patent rights are property rights that may be pro-
tected in inverse condemnation action); cf Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida
Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (commenting that
"[w]hat a patentee may arguably 'lose' through being limited to a 'takings'
claim or similar state court proceeding is not the ability to obtain any remedy,
but the benefit of provisions in the patent statute relating to remedy, for exam-
ple, the provisions of 35 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 285 (1988) relating to enhanced
1414 [Vol. 33:1399
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In order to recover in an inverse condemnation action, a claim-
ant must typically show (1) ownership of a property right; (2) that the
defendant substantially participated in some activity for public use or
benefit; (3) that the property right was taken or damaged, thereby
suffering loss or diminution in value; and (4) that the government's
activity was the proximate or substantial cause of the taking or dam-
age.
64
The ownership element parallels requirements of federal intel-
lectual property law. The second element could present a problem in
some circumstances. In California, for example, injury must result
from a deliberate act for the purpose of fulfilling a public objective.
Negligent acts committed during the routine operation of the public
entity do not give rise to a claim. 65 This could be a problem in some
areas of federal intellectual property law, such as the fair use doc-
trine,6 6 where the line demarcating infringement is notably vague.
Nevertheless, in view of the constitutional basis of inverse condem-
nation, the claimant does not have to prove that the defendant had
statutory authority to exercise the power of eminent domain. 67 There
are, however, some federal cases suggesting that a takings claimant
must prove that the state actor's conduct resulting in the deprivation
of private property was "duly authorized by law," 68 although the de-
gree of such authorization has not been clearly established in the case
law. 69
There could also be difficulty in applying the third element:
determining whether property has been taken.70  In the case of
damages and attorney fees").
64. See, e.g., Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d
129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965); 2 NORMAN E. MATTEONI, CONDEMNATION
PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA § 13.3 (1998).
65. See Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955).
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1994).
67. "All that is necessary to show is that the damage resulted from an exer-
cise of governmental power while seeking to promote 'the general interest in
its relation to any legitimate object of government'." Baker v. Burbank-
Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 39 Cal. 3d 862, 867, 705 P.2d 866, 868, 218
Cal. Rptr. 293, 295 (1985).
68. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
69. See Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 52, at 1475-77.
70. Cf Cotter, supra note 52, at 529.
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tangible property, only one person can enjoy exclusive use of real
estate or a tangible asset at any given time. Intellectual property, by
contrast, can be enjoyed by many simultaneously, an attribute re-
ferred to as nonrivalrous consumption. For example, many automo-
bile manufacturers can make use of the knowledge necessary to
make intermittent windshield wipers. Therefore, the government's
use of the intellectual property does not technically prevent others
from making use of the same ideas or information. The better view
would be that infringement of intellectual property constitutes a tak-
ing because it deprives the owner of the intellectual property of a re-
turn stream.71 Without this ability to appropriate a reward for in-
vestment and creativity, there would be little incentive to pursue
costly, difficult, and often valuable forms of innovation.
The measure of damages in an inverse condemnation action is
generally the fair market value of the property taken. 72 The date of
valuation is generally the date the taking or injury occurred. A prop-
erty owner who prevails may also recover prejudgment interest from
the date of the taking or damage. A prevailing plaintiff is also enti-
tled to attorney fees and reimbursement of costs. 7 3 While some of
these remedies are more generous than federal causes of action,
which, for example, do not provide for attorney fees except in ex-
traordinary circumstances, 74 the compensation award will likely fall
below the damages available under the federal intellectual property
statutes.75  The compensation will, however, approximate that
71. The Supreme Court's references to intellectual property rights as falling
within the ambit of the Takings Clause definition of property rights supports
this view. See Heald & Wells, supra note 52, at 857-64; supra notes 47-58 and
accompanying text.
72. See 2 MATTEONI, supra note 61, § 13.6.
73. See id. § 17.10-.11.
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (affording district courts discretion to award costs
and attorney's fees in copyright actions); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) (authorizing
district courts resolving patent cases to award attorney's fees to the prevailing
party in "exceptional cases"); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)
(rejecting automatic award of attorney's fees to prevailing party in copyright
actions).
75. Damages under federal patent law "shall be adequate to compensate for
the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use
made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed
by the court .... [T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed." 35 U.S.C. § 284. Copyright law provides for
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available to intellectual property owners for infringement of their
rights by the federal government.
76
If an intellectual property owner cannot recover for infringement
of their federal intellectual property rights through a state inverse
condemnation action, then he or she should be able to bring an action
for violation of their federal constitutional rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments because the state would not have provided
an adequate remedy for the taking of the intellectual property
owner's property.
b. tort claims
In addition to inverse condemnation claims, intellectual property
owners may be able to protect their rights and obtain compensation
by pursuing a variety of tort claims against the state, state agencies,
and state actors. In appropriate circumstances, an intellectual prop-
erty owner may be able to cast aspects of the injurious state conduct
under tort causes of action such as conversion, unjust enrichment,
misappropriation, unfair competition, deceit, and misrepresenta-
tion.77 In order to prevail, however, the claimant would need to
overcome sovereign immunity, preemption, and substantive law hur-
dles.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields states from lawsuits
in their own courts without their consent. 78 Furthermore, states may
not be held liable in their own courts for torts committed by their of-
ficers, agents, or employees unless they have waived their immu-
nity.7 9 The basis for this doctrine-that the sovereign could not be
sued-originated in the context of monarchical, religious rule where
"the King could do no wrong." This historical basis has gradually
given way in democratic societies to a more utilitarian justification
award of the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional profits or, in
cases where damages are minimal, statutory damages. See 17 U.S.C. § 504.
76. See supra note 46.
77. The elements of these torts are set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (1965). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 88-92 (5th ed. 1984) (setting out the elements).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B (1965) (collecting state
positions on governmental immunity); CRAIG, supra note 35, § 1.1 (collecting
case law authority for most states).
79. See 1 CRAIG, supra note 38, § 1.1.
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emphasizing social policy considerations such as protecting the state
from interference with the execution of governmental functions.
80
Most states have abolished sovereign immunity for tort claims
against the state directly and on the basis of respondeat superior in
whole or part.81 Some states have enacted open-ended waivers of li-
ability which allow for all suits against the state unless expressly ex-
cepted.82 Others have retained sovereign immunity subject to spe-
cific exceptions. 83  Some states authorize their legislatures to
consider special bills or resolutions to provide compensation on indi-
vidual claims.
84
Notwithstanding their sovereign immunity waivers, many states
impose procedural requirements and limits on recovery applicable to
suits against the sovereign (and state employees). Most states require
that a notice of a tort claim be filed with the state and that adminis-
trative remedies be exhausted prior to commencing legal action.
85
Many states establish special courts, boards, or commissions that
have exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the state. In others, a
claimant proceeds to state court after the claim has been presented to
the special board or commission.86  Some states limit the total
amount and types of damages that may be awarded. 7
Assuming that they can lodge an action against the state and
apart from limits on recovery, intellectual property owners face sig-
nificant additional hurdles to recovery under state tort causes of ac-
tion. Federal law preempts any other "legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright ' 88 and state laws that conflict with or undermine the
80. See 72 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 99 (1974).
81. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability
§ 129 (1988) (collecting Tort Claims Acts of every state).
82. See 1 CRAIG, supra note 38, § 3.5, at 188-92 (collecting statutes).
83. See id. § 3.5 at 192-94 (collecting statutes).
84. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 11.065 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. §
28-5-83 (1999). Some state constitutions prohibit state legislatures from pass-
ing special legislation to compensate for claims against the state. See, e.g.,
IND. CONST. art. 4, § 24; see also 1 CRAIG, supra note 38, § 3.11.
85. See 1 CRAIG, supra note 38, ch. 5.
86. See id. §§ 3.7-.8.
87. See id. §§ 6.7-.16.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
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comprehensive federal regime for protecting inventions."9 Nonethe-
less, the federal regime does not preclude all state causes of action
that protect creativity and innovation. The Copyright Act does not
preempt state laws that require, in order to establish liability, proof of
an "extra element" beyond those required to prove infringement of
one of the exclusive rights granted by federal copyright law.90 On
this basis, the Second Circuit held that copyright law does not pre-
empt a state misappropriation claim requiring proof that the defen-
dant had appropriated time sensitive information in such a manner as
to threaten the existence of the product or service provided by the
plaintiff.91 The Ninth Circuit has found that the Copyright Act does
not preempt claims requiring proof of conversion of a physical object
and claims based on breach of a fiduciary duty.
92
Similarly, federal patent law does not preempt a state law tort
claim
even if it requires the state court to adjudicate a question of
federal patent law, provided the state law cause of action
includes additional elements not found in the federal patent
law cause of action and is not an impermissible attempt to
offer patent-like protection to subject matter addressed by
federal law.
93
Courts have held that federal patent law does not, in general, preempt
state unfair competition94 or misappropriation doctrines.95
89. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989). See generally ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (2d ed. 2000) (discussing federal preemp-
tion of state law).
90. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir.
1997); see also Nicholas Khadder, National Basketball Association v. Mo-
torola, Inc., Annual Review of Law & Technology, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 3
(1998) (summarizing case and history of misappropriation doctrine).
91. See National Basketball, 105 F.3d at 853; National Car Rental Sys., Inc.
v. Computer Assocs., Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Smith
v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that writer's
unfair competition claim which sought to recover profits derived from use of
his ideas was preempted by federal copyright law, but that breach of contract
and confidential relationship claims were not), affd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir.
1984).
92. See Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 620, 636 (9th Cir. 1984).
93. Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
94. See id.
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The broad scope of federal preemption of state tort law related
to the protection of federal intellectual property interests, as well as
the relatively narrow scope of these alternative tort remedies, suggest
that state tort law provides a relatively modest cudgel for intellectual
property owners to fill the gap created by the Florida Prepaid deci-
sions. Under the conventional view of preemption doctrine, the
closer state tort law approximates federal patent and copyright law,
the less likely it is to survive preemption scrutiny.
A 1993 decision by the Florida Supreme Court offers an alter-
native approach to preemption analysis that could bridge the gap left
by the Florida Prepaid decisions. In Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v.
Department of Transportation,96 the plaintiff alleged, in addition to
the takings/inverse condemnation claim discussed earlier,97 that the
Florida Department of Transportation had committed the tort of con-
version by infringing the plaintiffs federal patent. In rejecting the
State's preemption argument, the Florida Supreme Court reasoned
that
Congress could not have intended to reserve for the federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims against states
arising under the patent statutes because such claims could
not have been brought in federal court due to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The patent statutes were intended
to provide a remedy, not exclude one.
98
The court emphasized that a contrary ruling would not only deny a
particular remedy, but also would deny the plaintiff any "access to
courts to redress its grievances. This cannot be countenanced in light
of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, which provides
that '[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any in-
jury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or de-
lay.'
' 99
Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court cited this aspect of the
Jacobs Wind case in Florida Prepaid,100 it remains to be seen
whether federal courts will adopt this interpretation of federal
95. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Corp., 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
96. 626 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1993).
97. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
98. Jacobs Wind, 626 So. 2d at 1336.
99. Id. at 1337.
100. 119 S. Ct. at 2209 n.9.
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preemption when they are directly confronted. In determining the
scope of federal preemption, federal courts have focused upon the
subject matter overlap between state and federal regimes and not on
the entities subject to liability. There is little doubt that the Florida
courts could not adjudicate a conversion claim of this type between
private parties. Yet it seems a bit of a stretch to infer, as the Florida
Supreme Court did, that the U.S. Congress intended for state courts
to adjudicate patent cases against states and state entities. Nonethe-
less, the Florida Supreme Court's pragmatic logic bolsters the federal
system and because it is limited to actions against states, does not
create a direct jurisdictional conflict.
If the federal courts were to accept this view of federal preemp-
tion, intellectual property owners would have to test whether they
could enforce their federal intellectual property rights in like manner
in the courts of each state. Even in Florida, no court has yet held that
infringement of federal intellectual property rights constitutes con-
version. Although the common law of conversion has expanded over
the years to encompass some forms of intangible assets, 10 1 it has not
yet been applied to interferences with intellectual property standing
alone.10 2 It remains to be seen whether and to what extent this tort
101. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 222A-249
(1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 72, at 88-92. The tort of conversion grew
out of the common law action of trover, which provided a remedy against
someone who found lost goods. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242
cmt. d; Hill, A New Found Haliday: The Conversion of Intangible Propert-
Re-Examination of the Action of Trover and Tort of Conversion, 1972 UTAH L.
REv. 511. Therefore, conversion could not apply to land because land could
not be lost. Similarly, intangibles did not fit easily into the category of goods
that can be lost. The tort of conversion has gradually evolved beyond the
common law action of trover. The Restatement Second reflects this trend in
recognizing conversion of documents establishing intangible rights, although
this formulation does not extend directly to intellectual property rights. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 (1965).
102. See Hurst v. Dezer/Reyes Corp., 82 F.3d 232 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing
finding of conversion of business concept when licensee continued to use the
licensed name and trade dress after breaching license agreement on grounds
that intangible property right was not identified with or merged in a docu-
ment); Miles, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091
(S.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that California had not recognized a cause of action
for conversion of the intangible right to commercialize a cell line); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 72, at 92. See generally Jeff C. Dodd, Rights in Information:
Conversion and Misappropriation Causes of Action in Intellectual Property
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theory could be used to obtain remedies for patent and copyright in-
fringement by the state. The larger limitation of this approach would
appear to be whether other states analyze preemption and open up
their courts in this manner. One Texas court has already expressed
some doubts. 10 3 Tort causes of action, as well as the interpretation of
the scope of federal preemption and the extent of waiver of sovereign
immunity, vary across states. Nonetheless, the Florida Supreme
Court's pragmatic interpretations of federal preemption doctrine and
the tort of conversion afford some promise that intellectual property
owners have reasonably effective remedies for state infringement of
their federal rights in at least one state.
c. state intellectual property law claims
Even though intellectual property owners cannot sue states for
infringing their federal intellectual property rights in state court,1
0 4
they may be able to recover in state courts for state violations of state
intellectual property laws. Because of the preemptive sweep of fed-
eral copyright and patent law, states cannot duplicate the protection
afforded by these regimes under state law. Nonetheless, they afford
some room for alternative means of protecting innovation. All states
have trade secret laws 10 5 which afford substantial protection for
Cases, 32 HOUS. L. REv. 459, 498 (1995) (concluding that courts "now protect
information that touches some document, giving it an independently verifiable
existence, even though the information is not necessarily merged in or identi-
fied with that document"); Val D. Ricks, Comment, The Conversion of Intan-
gible Property: Bursting the Ancient Trover Bottle with New Wine, 1991 BYU
L. REv. 1681, 1703-04 (1991) (listing cases in which conversion has been rec-
ognized for intangibles).
103. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. Texas, 902 S.W.2d 576, 578-79 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1995).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994) provides that federal district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action arising under any
act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, and copyrights.
Therefore, intellectual property owners may not assert claims under these stat-
utes in state court. Furthermore, under the Supreme Court's decision in Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), states have sovereign immunity against suits in
their own courts for violations of federal law. Therefore, Congress cannot
subject a state to liability for infringing federal intellectual property law in its
own courts without the state's consent.
105. The Supreme Court has ruled that federal patent law does not preempt
state trade secret law. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
(1974); Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., Inc., 522 F. Supp
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innovation. Forty states have adopted some form of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act.'0 6 The remaining states rely primarily upon the
principles reflected in the Restatement of Torts or the more compre-
hensive and recent formulation in the Restatement of Unfair Compe-
tition.1 0 7 Unlike the federal patent and copyright regimes, federal
trademark law does not generally preempt analogous state law.
10 8
All states have legislation providing for the registration and protec-
tion of trademarks. 109 Numerous states protect the right of publicity,
a relatively recently developed intellectual property right which pre-
vents others from appropriating a person's identity, image, or per-
sona for commercial gain."10
As with tort actions, a claimant cannot sue the state even under
its own intellectual property laws unless the state has waived its sov-
ereign immunity. Where a state has waived its sovereign immunity
through an open-ended statute11 and does not provide exceptions for
367 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
106. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 2.03[7](a), at 2-27 n.51 (1997)
(collecting state codes).
107. See id. § 2.02[3] (explaining evolution of the Restatement relating to
trade secret law).
108. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b)(5) (1999) (referring to the continued
effect of state law); Richard A. De Sevo, Antidilution Laws: The Unresolved
Dilemma of Preemption Under the Lanham Act, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 300,
301-04 (1994). But cf Three Blind Mice Designs Co. v. Cyrk Inc., 892 F.
Supp. 303 (D. Mass. 1995) (preempting state antidilution statute to the extent
that it seeks to regulate competitive goods). The recently enacted federal anti-
dilution law, 15 U.S.C. § 43(c)(3), allows state antidilution laws to continue in
force but grants owners of federally registered marks immunity from suit under
such state laws. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (accompanying H.R. 1295)
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1033. A number of cases hold that
state protection against confusion and passing off is not preempted by federal
copyright law. See, e.g., Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs., Inc. v. Conti-
nental Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1986).
109. Substantially all of these enactments follow the Model State Trademark
Bill. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9
statutory note (1995) (collecting state statutes); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (4th ed. 1996).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49; J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (1937). Fed-
eral intellectual property law does not generally preempt state protection of the
right of publicity. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562
(1977).
111. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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state intellectual property statutes and common law, it can be in-
ferred that the state permits claimants to pursue whatever legal or
administrative process that the state has established for seeking re-
dress."12 Where a state waives sovereign immunity through a closed-
ended statute' 13 and has not expressly authorized suits against the
state for violations of its intellectual property statutes, courts may
hold that the state cannot be sued for violations of its own intellectual
property laws. 1 4 It can be argued, however, that trademark, trade
secret, and right of publicity causes of action grow out of tort theo-
ries of recovery. 1 5 To date, there have been relatively few reported
cases determining whether states have waived immunity to liability
under their own intellectual property statutes.
Even if actionable against the state, state intellectual property
law does not directly compensate for state infringement of federal
patent and copyright law. Depending upon the circumstances, how-
ever, they may, in concert with other tort remedies discussed earlier,
afford intellectual property owners effective substitutes for federal
patent and copyright protections. For example, a company regularly
doing business with the state may elect to rely more heavily upon
trade secret protection if federal patent protection is not effective
against the state." 
6
112. See, e.g., Management Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of Regents of N. Ill. Univ.,
618 N.E.2d 694, 707-08 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that state may be sued in
Court of Claims for alleged trade secret violations).
113. See supra text accompanying note 81.
114. See, e.g., Texas A & M Univ. Sys. v. University Book Store, Inc., 683
S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a suit to cancel the certificate of
registration of five service marks issued by the secretary of state to Texas A &
M University was an attempt to control valid and proper state action that was
not maintainable without the state's consent).
115. Trade secret protection was part of the first RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § §
757-59 (1939). Trademark law comprises various aspects of unfair competi-
tion, unjust enrichment, passing off, and various other tort law concepts, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmts. b & c (1995), al-
though the antidilution provisions reflect more of a property orientation. See
PETER S. MENELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENERAL THEORIES,
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000). The right
of publicity also has tort roots, growing out of defamation, privacy, and false
advertising principles. See MCCARTHY, supra note 105, at ch. 1.
116. Cf MERGES ET AL., supra note 84; David D. Friedman et al., Some
Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 61 (1991); Richard
C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and De-
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d. contract claims
Intellectual property owners may have a contractual basis for
seeking damages and other remedies from states. States often con-
tract for products and services that involve intellectual property
rights. A state agency may agree to restrictions on the use and distri-
bution of products embodying intellectual property as part of a li-
censing agreement or some other contractual nexus. Software ven-
dors, for example, commonly distribute computer programs through
end-user licensing agreements. 117 Intellectual property owners who
present proposals to state agencies may be able to draw upon princi-
ples of implied contract and confidential relationship law.118 Intel-
lectual property owners may be able to enforce these provisions
through state court contract actions.
As with tort claims, intellectual property owners can bring con-
tract claims against the state only if the state has waived its sovereign
immunity and authorized suit for such claims. Many states expressly
waive their sovereign immunity for contractual liability through their
constitution 19 or by state statute. In addition, many state courts
velopment, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783-831 (1987) (noting
the importance of trade secrets relative to patent protection in many industries).
117. See generally MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET
LAW ch. 1 (2000).
118. See Lionel S. Sobel, TheLaw ofldeas, Revisited, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
9 (1994).
119. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, IX(c); LA. CONST. art. 12, § 10(A).
120. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Michie 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. §§
19-10-201 to 210 (Michie 1999); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 884 (West 1999);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-61(a) (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-1 (1999); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 661-1 (1999); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8 (West 1999); IND.
CODE § 34-4-16-1.1 (1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45A.245 (Michie 1999);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1510-A (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV'T § 12-201(a) (1999); MINN. STAT. § 3.751 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. §
41.031 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 491:8 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
37-1-23 (Michie 1999); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1999); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-12-02 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A)(1) (West
1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.320 (1999); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4651-1 (1999);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-13.1-1 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-32-2, -10
(Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(L) (1999); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-30-5 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.010 (1999); W. VA. CODE
§§ 14-2-4, -13 (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104 (Michie 1999); see also
Parsa v. State, 474 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y. 1984) (charging contracting party with
knowledge of statutes regulating the state's power to enter into contracts).
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infer that a state waives its sovereign immunity for contractual li-
ability by validly entering into a contract. 12 1 Some state courts have
abolished sovereign immunity for contractual liability altogether.
122
Only a few states bar suits in state court for breach of contract
claims against the state. Vermont does not apply its waiver of tort
liability to "damages caused by the fiscal operations of any state of-
ficer or department." 123  Wisconsin requires that contract claims
against the state be presented to a Claims Board which can propose
to the legislature that a private bill for compensation be enacted.
124
The Texas Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the vitality of sover-
eign immunity from contractual liability in the Lone Star State.
125
Even though substantially all states allow contract actions
against the state to be heard in state court, some contractual provi-
sions that overlap substantially with federal intellectual property
rights may be preempted. Contractual provisions that do not impli-
cate the policies of the federal intellectual property system easily
survive scrutiny, even if a state tribunal must assess the validity of a
121. See, e.g., State Highway Dep't v. Milton Constr. Co., 586 So. 2d 872,
875 (Ala. 1991); Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d
508, 370 P.2d 338, 20 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1962); Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colo-
rado Dep't of Agric., 314 P.2d 278, 280 (Colo. 1957); George & Lynch, Inc. v.
State, 197 A.2d 734, 736 (Del. 1964); Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department
of Corrections, 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1985); Regents of Univ. Sys. v. Blanton,
176 S.E. 673, 675 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934); Grant Constr. Co. v. Bums, 443 P.2d
1005, 1010 (Idaho 1968); Kersten Co. v. Department of Soc. Servs., 207
N.W.2d 117, 120 (Iowa 1973); J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 494
N.E.2d 374, 377 (Mass. 1986); Hersey Gravel Co. v. State, 9 N.W.2d 567, 569
(Mich. 1943); State Highway Comm'n v. Wunderlich, 11 So. 2d 437, 438
(Miss. 1943); V.S. DiCarlo Constr. Co. v. State, 485 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo.
1972); Meens v. State Bd. of Educ., 267 P.2d 981, 984-85 (Mont. 1954); Smith
v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 423-24 (N.C. 1976); State Bd. of Pub. Affairs v.
Principal Funding Corp., 542 P.2d 503, 505-06 (Okla. 1975); Kinsey Constr.
Co. v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, 249 S.E.2d 900, 903 (S.C.
1978); Wiecking v. Allied Med. Supply Corp., 391 S.E.2d 258, 261 (Va.
1990).
122. See Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 381 P.2d 107, 109 (Ariz.
1963); Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 540 P.2d 66, 84-86 (Kan. 1975); Todd v.
Board of Educ. Lands & Funds, 48 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Neb. 1951); P. T. & L.
Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, Dep't of Transp., 288 A.2d 574, 578 (N.J. 1972).
123. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 (1999).
124. See WIs. STAT. § 16.007 (1999).
125. See Federal Sign v. Texas S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997).
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federal intellectual property right in the process of adjudicating the
contract dispute. 12 6 Those contractual restrictions that undermine the
policies of the federal intellectual property system are preempted.
127
Courts have struggled to develop clear principles with regard to the
viability of software licensing agreements that supplant some of
copyright's default rules. 128 This challenge has been exacerbated by
the fact that computer software vendors and Internet retailers have
increasingly used shrinkwrap and clickwrap license agreements in
transacting. 129 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws recently approved the Uniform Computer Informa-
tion Transactions Act (UCITA), which generally permits parties to
enforce shrinkwrap agreements. Under the Supremacy Clauge of the
U.S. Constitution, however, the enforceability of contracts pursuant
126. See, e.g., Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn.,
804 F.2d 129, 132-33 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[T]here are no policies reflected in
acts of Congress which require that the federal courts enjoin... a state court
contract suit seeking royalties payable under a patent license wherein the state
court is or could be asked by the defendant to rule on the validity of the pat-
ent."); Smith, 578 F. Supp. at 1307 (holding that breach of contract and confi-
dential relationship claims are not preempted by copyright law), affd, 738
F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984).
127. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (invalidating con-
tractual provision prohibiting licensee to challenge the validity of patent);
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (holding unenforceable patent li-
censed in agreement that extends beyond the patent's term).
128. Compare Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that disclaimer of warranty and limitation of remedies terms in
a shrinkwrap license agreement did not become part of parties' agreement),
and Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a provision in the license agreement of a producer of anticopying software
which prohibited decompilation or disassembly of its program was unenforce-
able), with ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (taking a
narrow view of federal copyright preemption in enforcing shrinkwrap license
agreements that prohibited the copying of uncopyrightable material), and Hill
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that terms sent
to buyer in the box in which the computer was shipped, including an arbitra-
tion clause, were binding on the buyer). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Be-
yond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87
CAL. L. Rv. 111, 142 (1999) ("[Courts must] attempt to figure out whether
each particular provision in the Copyright Act is merely a default rule that the
parties are free to ignore, or whether it instead reflects a part of the balance of
interests in federal policy that should not be upset.").
129. See Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D.
Utah 1997).
June 2000] 1427
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
to state laws remain subject to the preemptive force of copyright and
other federal laws.
As this review of the vast and complex legal landscape reveals,
the striking down of the intellectual property remedy clarification
acts does not exempt states from liability for infringing intellectual
property rights. Federal law continues to provide prospective reme-
dies to enjoin infringement of federal intellectual property rights. In
addition, intellectual property owners can recover monetary damages
from state employees who violate federal intellectual property rights.
Furthermore, state remedies for inverse condemnation and violations
of tort, state intellectual property, and contract laws create a variety
of opportunities for intellectual property owners to pursue retrospec-
tive monetary damages. The amount of damages available through
these forms of recourse may well be less than the remedies under
federal patent and copyright law. In addition, many of these state
law theories have not been widely tested in the context of intellectual
property rights. The lack of uniformity and novel aspects of these
avenues of legal and administrative recourse will complicate the
lives of intellectual property owners whose rights are infringed by
states and state officials. Intellectual property owners with smaller
stakes may well decide that these remedies are not worth the effort.
B. Social and Bureaucratic Constraints on State Infringement of
Intellectual Property Rights
Even if the law afforded state and state actors complete immu-
nity from liability for infringement of federal intellectual property
rights, social and bureaucratic constraints, market restraints, and po-
litical checks would significantly regulate state infringement activ-
ity.130 These various constraints are often interrelated. In addition,
they interact with the legal constraints discussed previously. It is
worthwhile, however, to explore each of these governance regimes
individually so as to better understand the implications of the Florida
Prepaid decisions. This section focuses on the role of social norms
and bureaucratic constraints in regulating state infringement. The
treatment of each regulatory institution will discuss some of the
130. Cf ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (emphasizing the role of social norms in regulating
human behavior).
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feedback and interactive effects among the various governance sys-
tems.
1. Distinctive characteristics of public administration
Economic analysis of legal rules often proceeds from the prem-
ise that entities and actors will maximize their economic self-interest.
In such a framework, we would predict that entities and actors will
infringe intellectual property rights if there are no remedies to pe-
nalize such behavior and such infringement promotes their economic
self-interest. Therefore, assuming that there were no effective reme-
dies against state infringement, then state governments and their em-
ployees would be prone to infringe federal intellectual property
rights. This perspective, however, overlooks the role of social norms
and other institutional constraints upon the behavior of the relevant
entities and actors. State entities and employees do not typically ap-
proach their jobs from a narrowly self-interested perspective. Fur-
thermore, they operate within complex institutional structures that
regulate the actions of both the entities and the employees.
The environment in which state entities and employees operate
differs markedly from the private sector.1 3 1 With regard to the pro-
pensity to infringe intellectual property rights, the following charac-
teristics have most relevance: the nature of the activities conducted,
the goals of the organization, the ethics and integrity of decision-
makers, the extent to which employee conduct is constrained by rules
and policies, the openness and permeability of the working environ-
ment, the accountability of employees, incentives for employee ad-
vancement, and the profile of the workforce.
Nature of Activities. State agencies and entities perform a wide
range of functions, many of which differ in significant ways from
private sector enterprises. State agencies and organizations regulate
private activities that cause adverse effects-such as pollution,
crime, and health and safety exposures-provide various social
services, assist markets in functioning by licensing and regulating
activities, offer education, health care, and other services, and pro-
vide and maintain basic infrastructure such as roads and
131. See HAL G. RAINEY, UNDERSTANDING & MANAGING PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS 73-74 (2d ed. 1997) (table summarizing distinctive charac-
teristics of public management of organizations).
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transportation. Because of the differences among these functions,
state entities differ significantly in the ways in which they are or-
ganized and the compositions of their work forces.
Goals. In view of the nature of these activities and the essential
public-regarding qualities of government, state entities, unlike most
private sector enterprises, do not seek to maximize profits. Rather
they typically pursue multiple, sometimes competing, goals. For ex-
ample, state police and highway patrols seek to protect public safety,
prevent crime, and respect individual rights, as well as conserve
public resources. 132 Environmental agencies are instructed to both
conserve resources and develop them.133 State entities, therefore,
tend to pursue more multifaceted, ambiguous, and conflicting goals
than private corporations.
134
Ethics and Integrity of Decisionmakers. The public holds gov-
ernment entities and officials to higher standards of fairness, honesty,
openness, and accountability than private actors. As a reflection of
government officials' quasi-fiduciary responsibility to protect the
public trust, the American Society for Public Administration stresses,
in its code of ethics, the need for public administrators to "respect,
support, study, and when necessary, work to improve federal and
state constitutions, and other laws which define the relationships
among public agencies, employees, clients, and all citizens."
135
Rule-Oriented Work Environment. State government organiza-
tions tend to be bureaucratic and rule driven. This is partly attribut-
able to the large size of many public entities, but also reflects legal
constraints and oversight by legislative and executive bodies and
civil service and union rules.
132. See MARK H. MOORE, POLICE LEADERSHIP: THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM,
reprinted in IMPOSSIBLE JOBS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (Erwin C. Hargrove &
John C. Glidewell eds., 1990).
133. See AARON B. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER 215 (1979).
134. See THEODORE I. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1979); RAINEY, su-
pra note 126, at 128-30; HAROLD SEIDMAN & ROBERT GILMOUR, POLITICS,
POSITION, AND POWER (1986).
135. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, CODE OF ETHICS
AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES (1984); see Donald J. Maletz, The Place of
Constitutionalism in the Education of Public Administrators, 23 ADMIN. &
SOC'Y 374 (1991); Ralph C. Chandler, The Problem of Moral Reasoning in
American Public Administration: The Case for a Code of Ethics, 43 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 32 (1983).
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Openness and Permeability of Working Environment. Govern-
ment entities conduct their activities through public processes. Many
important decisions are made through formal, on the record, proc-
esses in which citizens have the opportunity to participate through
submitting comments and attending public hearings. In the post-
Watergate era, most states adopted far-reaching freedom of informa-
tion laws that afford citizens and the media wide access to public re-
cords.136 The media, agency clients and constituents, and interested
citizens can gain access to much of what public entities do. By con-
trast, the decision-making processes of most private corporations are
shielded from public view. Many companies consider information
developed within their factories and offices to be trade secrets.
Accountability of State Employees. Public employees are typi-
cally accountable to a wide range of constituencies. They fall under
the governance of executive and legislative oversight bodies, as well
as other governing authorities. For example, the University of Cali-
fornia is governed by a Board of Regents selected by the governor.
Its budget is determined by the legislature and approved by the gov-
ernor. The performance of public entities is scrutinized by various
external constituencies, including the media, interest groups, and
others.
Incentives for Advancement. The rigid bureaucratic structure of
public entities-reflecting the rule-oriented work environment and
civil service and union influences-constrain the ways in which em-
ployees may advance within the public sector employment hierarchy.
Because of the multifaceted, vague, and sometimes ambiguous goals
of government entities, public organizations do not have the same
ability as private profit-centered enterprises to develop clear per-
formance measures. As a result, they tend to evaluate employee per-
formance based on adherence to procedure and compliance with
rules.
137
136. See generally JUSTIN B. FRANKLIN & ROBERT E. BOUCHARD, THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIvACY ACTS (2d ed. 1999) (compiling
public information acts from each state).
137. See Allen H. Barton, A Diagnosis of Bureaucratic Maladies, in
MAKING BUREAUCRACIES WORK (C.H. Weiss & A.H. Barton eds., 1980);
ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND
WELFARE (1953); Hal G. Rainey, Public Agencies and Private Firms: Incen-
tive Structures, Goals, and Individual Roles, 15 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 207 (1983).
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Profile of the Public Sector Workforce. The financial rewards
available in public employment are constrained by civil service and
legislative pay scales. The civil service system and the high rate of
unionization in the public sector typically afford public employees
better job security than those in the private sector. Not surprisingly,
studies reveal that public employment attracts workers seeking this
balance of job attributes: public employees place a higher value on
job security, 138 but a lower value on financial rewards, 139 than their
counterparts in the private sector. Similarly, the public sector tends
to attract employees who place higher a value on intrinsic rewards,
self-sacrifice, and public service than workers in the private sector.
140
2. Implications for state infringement of federal
intellectual property rights
These distinctive characteristics of state government suggest that
state entities are unlikely to adopt policies encouraging, permitting,
or excusing infringement of federal intellectual property rights. The
Florida Prepaid decisions do not condone state infringement; rather,
they limit the ways in which intellectual property owners can enforce
their rights against states. But it is unlikely, given our organizational
culture and institutional constraints, that states or state organizations
will embark on policies that conflict with federal law. State entities
generally require that their employees adhere to federal and state law
in carrying out their responsibilities. Many also have specific poli-
cies relating to intellectual property. For example, the University of
California has specific policies and guidelines designed to ensure
that employees do not violate federal intellectual property law.1
4 1
Nor are state officials or employees likely to infringe intellectual
property rights. The public sector attracts workers who are disin-
clined to violate the law. Moreover, state employees operate within
138. See RAINEY, supra note 131, at 213-15.
139. See Mak Khojasteh, Motivating the Private vs. Public Sector Managers,
22 PuB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 391 (1993); Rainey, supra note 132, at 207.
140. See RAINEY, supra note 131, at 216-18; Steven Kelman, "Public
Choice" and Public Spirit, 87 PuB. INTEREST 80 (Spring 1987) (arguing that
public employees reflect a norm of public spiritedness).
141. See, e.g., University of California Policy and Guidelines on the Repro-
duction of Copyrighted Materials for Teaching and Research (visited Mar. 30,
2000) <http://www.ucop.edu/ucophome/uwnews/copyrep.html>.
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highly structured and open environments in which their activities can
be easily scrutinized by supervisory officials as well as the public.
Furthermore, they cannot expect to profit in any significant way from
infringing activities-either through direct commercial activities or
improving the bottom line for their division-because government
employees do not have equity stakes in their operations and state
agencies do not budget within a profit-maximizing framework. By
engaging in significant infringing activities, public employees open
themselves up to being sued in their personal capacity for monetary
damages and expose their employers to injunctions and embarrassing
public scrutiny. Although the public employees might be able to get
indemnification and representation by the public entity, they jeop-
ardize their job security, something that public employees generally
value highly. Therefore, they have little if anything to gain, and a lot
to lose, from infringing federal intellectual property rights.
This is not to say that state entities and employees will never in-
fringe federal intellectual property rights. State entities and employ-
ees may unintentionally infringe such rights, but it is likely that they
will be responsive to the interested parties in many circumstances. In
some cases, state entities may not invoke state sovereignty. 142 Fur-
thermore, as noted in the prior section, intellectual property owners
are not without legal recourse. Even in the absence of these disin-
centives, the nature of public entities and the employees attracted to
them suggest that state infringement, to 'the extent it occurs, is likely
to be unintentional and episodic in most areas of state activity.
One area in which social and bureaucratic constraints will
probably have less of a dampening effect on state infringement re-
lates to state university research. 143 University laboratories have
produced many of the breakthroughs on which the biotechnology and
digital technology industries are based. A number of developments
have drawn universities into the commercial sphere, which inevitably
raises the potential for infringement of intellectual property rights.
142. See, e.g., Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997) (sovereign immu-
nity not invoked), affd, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
286 (1999).
143. See Robert G. Bone, From Property to Contract: The Eleventh Amend-
ment and University-Private Sector Intellectual Property Relationships, 33
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1467 (2000).
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First, many state legislatures have gradually decreased the percent-
age of the universities' budgets funded through state tax revenues.
Second, the growth rate of federal funding of university research has
gradually declined over the past decade.144 Third, the federal gov-
ernment, which provides funding for a substantial portion of univer-
sity research, now permits universities (and other nonprofit organi-
zations) to retain title to inventions funded from federal sources.
145
Fourth, government funding for university research has vacillated
over the years, motivating universities to expand their portfolio of
funding sources. 146 As a result, a number of leading state universi-
ties have developed patent licensing offices.
147
Lastly, university researchers and professors have increasingly
pursued opportunities to commercialize their research. The advent
and proliferation of venture financing has enabled university re-
searchers to start their own companies, leading many research pio-
neers to spin off university research projects into private commercial
ventures in which the university researcher is a substantial
stakeholder. These opportunities have changed the culture of
144. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING
INDICATORS: 1998 chs. 4-5.
145. See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28
(1980) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994)). See generally
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV.
1663 (1996).
146. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 144, at ch. 5 (noting that
for 1995, public academic institutions received 7% of research and develop-
ment funding from industry, 10% from state and local funds, 23% from insti-
tutional funds, and 54% from the federal government and that over the past
two decades, the federal share of support has declined, and the industry and in-
stitutional shares have increased).
147. See, e.g., Office of Technology Transfer, University of California (vis-
ited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.ucop.edu/ott/> (providing descriptions of tech-
nologies available for licensing from the University of California campuses).
See generally NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 139, at ch. 5 (noting a
sevenfold rise in the number of academic patents received annually between
the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s to more than 1800 in 1995 and that public
universities outpace private universities in obtaining patents); R. HENDERSON
ET AL., UNIVERSITIES AS A SOURCE OF COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY: A
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF UNIVERSITY PATENTING 1965-88 (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5068, 1995).
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university research laboratories. 148 Many university scientists enter-
ing public universities today seek both academic recognition and en-
trepreneurial opportunity.
State university researchers and professors have not typically fit
the traditional civil servant mold, but their traditional focus upon
academic recognition and basic scientific breakthroughs minimized
the risk that they would infringe or cause harm to the intellectual
property rights of others. As state universities and their researchers
look increasingly to the market for organizational and personal re-
turns, the risks to intellectual property right owners rise accordingly.
Not surprisingly, state universities are the one type of state entity that
has been involved in numerous and substantial intellectual property
disputes.
149
The implications of these trends are further complicated by the
in-flow of industry funds into state university research programs.
150
148. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science
in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987).
149. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Regents, 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
judgment vacated and remanded, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999); In re Regents, Misc.
No. 425, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 8032 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 1995); Synbiotics
Corp. v. Regents, No. 93-1253, 94-1079, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23902 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 29, 1994); In re Regents, 964 F.2d 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1992); New Star
Lasers, Inc. v. Regents, No. CIV. S-99-428, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13411
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 1999); Kucharczyk v. Regents, 48 F. Supp. 2d 964 (N.D.
Cal. 1999); Regents v. Veterinary Ctrs. of America, Inc., No. 1262, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1741 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 19, 1999); Candela Corp. v. Regents, 976 F.
Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1997); Regents v. Oncor, Inc., No. C-95-3084-VRW, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15068 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 1997); Dieter v. Regents, 963 F.
Supp. 908 (E.D. Cal. 1997); Brown v. Regents, 866 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal.
1994); Unix Sys. Labs., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp.
790 (D.N.J. 1993); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp., No. 91-5286, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3971 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 1993).
150. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAw 1026-29
(1998); NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 139, at ch. 5; Richard C. At-
kinson, The Future Arrives First in California, ISSUES IN Sci. & TECH. 45, 46-
48 (Winter 1999-2000) (describing the University of California's Industry-
University Cooperative Research Program); William L. Baldwin, The U.S. Re-
search University and the Joint Venture: Evolution of an Institution, 11 REv.
INDUST. ORG. 629 (1996); David Blumenthal et al., Industrial Support of Uni-
versity Research in Biotechnology, 231 SCIENCE 242, 244 (1986) (observing
that nearly half of all biotechnology firms support university research through
university-industry research programs); W.M. Cohen et al., Industry and the
Academy: Uneasy Partners in the Cause of Technological Advance, in
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Many of these programs create partnerships which enable donor
firms to commercialize some of the research developed. This raises
complex questions about whether the research is in fact public.
C. Market Responses to the Risks of State Infringement of
Intellectual Property Rights
Even apart from legal action, intellectual property owners can
engage in a variety of self-help responses to the risk of state in-
fringement of intellectual property rights. They can take advantage
of their economic clout directly in their dealings with states and state
entities by getting involved in state and federal politics.
With regard to market responses, intellectual property owners
have a wide range of relationships with the states. At one extreme,
they engage in direct, detailed negotiations for products and services
customized to the states needs such as standardized tests for state
employees, training films, and customized data processing software.
Similarly, many state universities now enter into long-term contrac-
tual relationships in the form of industry-university research consor-
tia and funding agreements. At the other extreme, the state can gain
access to proprietary technology without any formal contractual re-
lationship. For example, a state university professor can learn of a
proprietary technology by perusing issued patents or scientific publi-
cations. Between these extremes, states acquire technology products
(such as word processing software) through the retail marketplace.
Intellectual property owners can protect their technology from
improper appropriation by legal strangers-those with whom they
are not in a contractual relationship-by limiting access to their
works through either formal trade secrecy 151 or encryption. If state
entities cannot gain access to a work, then they cannot commandeer
it. These strategies can have significant drawbacks. By relying upon
trade secret, rather than patent protection, an inventor has no protec-
tion against someone who independently develops the invention. In
addition, the inventor might even lose the right to practice his or her
CHALLENGE TO THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY (Roger Noll ed., 1998).
151. In fact, apart from the pharmaceutical industry, most companies rely
more heavily upon trade secret protection than patent protection to discourage
unauthorized appropriation of their technology. See Levin et al., supra note
116, at 783.
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invention if another company obtains a patent. From society's
standpoint, trade secrecy can hinder the progress of research and de-
velopment by limiting the diffusion of new knowledge. By contrast,
the patent system promotes disclosure of innovation by requiring that
applicants adequately disclose and enable their invention. Encryp-
tion can limit the utility of a work by constraining the manner in
which the work can be used and customized.
Where an intellectual property owner has a formal, detailed
contractual relationship with a state, the intellectual property owner
can protect against infringement through the agreement. In substan-
tially all states, such agreements will be enforceable in state court.
The intellectual property owner could also insist upon waiver of state
sovereign immunity to federal lawsuits, although such waivers might
require legislative authorization in some states. The key determi-
nants will be the respective bargaining power of the parties and the
extent to which state law limits the terms of such contracts.
Focusing on the state university context, which appears to be the
area of greatest concern for infringement, the formation of industry-
university research agreements provides intellectual property owners
with more concentrated leverage for insisting upon protection from
infringement. State universities receive approximately seven percent
of their research funding, on average, from private sources. 15 2 These
relationships typically involve shared and ongoing governance be-
tween universities and private sector partners.
153
When the state acquires access to technology through the retail
marketplace, intellectual property can augment their federal intel-
lectual property protections through contractual limitations on in-
fringement. The software industry has increasingly relied on these
mechanisms through the use of shrinkwrap and clickwrap licensing
152. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 144, at ch. 5.
153. The Government-University-Industry Research Roundtable, which is
sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of
Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine, oversees approximately a dozen
research consortia between universities and industry. The Roundtable "ad-
dresses a wide array of concerns including nurturing science and engineering
talent, fmancing research facilities, promoting multidisciplinary research and
education, and enhancing federal-state cooperation in science and technology."
The Government-University-Industry Research Roundtable (visited Mar. 26,
2000) <http://www4.nationalacademies.org/pd/guirr.nsf>.
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agreements. Although the enforceability of these contracts has not
been decisively resolved,15 4 intellectual property owners will at a
minimum get their day in state court. Substantially all states have
consented to suit for breach of contract.
D. Political Constraints on State Infringement of Federal
Intellectual Property Rights
In addition to market solutions, intellectual property owners can
deter state infringement of intellectual property rights through politi-
cal efforts. As a class, intellectual property owners have tremendous
political clout. Entertainment industries have long been involved in
national and state politics.15 5 New technology companies are among
the most successful and wealthy enterprises in the United States.
Over the past two decades, they have become increasingly involved
in political affairs. American technology companies initially mobi-
lized in the early 1980s in an effort to push for stronger protection in
intellectual property laws abroad.156  More recently,
high-technology companies 157 and their trade associations1 5 8 have
154. See supra Part I.A.2.d.
155. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), representing the
seven largest film production and distribution companies, and the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA), representing the leading record pro-
ducers, have long been among the most active and influential lobbying organi-
zations in the United States. See William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legisla-
tive Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139
(1996); William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Pro-
tecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 922-24 (1997) (noting the
strong political power of traditional copyright interests); Sabra Chartrand,
Congress Has Extended Its Protection for Goofy, Gershwin, and Some Moguls
of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at C2.
156. See generally MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL
COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ch. 4 (1998).
157. See Bernard Dagenais, AOL Learns Lobby Game Is Necessary Expense,
WASH. TIMES, May 24, 1999, at D3; Rick Hepp, Silicon Prairie, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 17, 1999, at N1 (reporting that "the high technology industry is quickly
overcoming its aversion to the [political] process in an attempt to influence up-
coming legislation and the 2000 elections"); Carla Marinucci & Marc Sanda-
low, Silicon Valley Emerges As a Force In Politics: Divided Party Loyalties
Put in 2000 Spotlight, S.F. CHRON., May 10, 1999, at Al; Charles Piller,
Technet to Campaign for Issues of the 'New Economy'; Politics: Roberta Katz
Now Heads the Wealthy Lobbying Group that Is Likely to Be a Major Player in
the 2000 Election, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1999, at Cl; Sam Howe Verhovek,
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become deeply involved in lobbying and financing political cam-
paigns.
Intellectual property interests can exert political pressure to pre-
vent state infringement of intellectual property rights at both the state
and federal levels. At the state level, they can directly lobby state of-
ficials to proscribe infringement of intellectual property rights by
state entities and employees. Intellectual property owners can also
lobby legislatures to waive sovereign immunity to suits in federal
court or to make it easier for intellectual property owners to obtain
remedies in state courts. As an inducement, economically powerful
companies can threaten to invest only in states that provide sufficient
protection for intellectual property rights. If infringement occurs
predominantly in a particular sector of state government, such as
state universities, then intellectual property interests can focus their
efforts on the elected officials and governing boards that oversee and
fund those state entities.
At the federal level, intellectual property owners can pursue a
range of strategies to combat the risk of state infringement. The in-
tellectual property remedy clarification acts of the early 1990s were a
response to court decisions opening up a state immunity gap in the
federal intellectual property system, 159 and the legislative wheels
have already begun to turn since the Florida Prepaid decisions re-
opened that gap. 16° Even after the Florida Prepaid decisions, Con-
gress has a range of options for constraining infringement of federal
intellectual property rights by states, including clarifying congres-
sional intent to allow Exparte Young actions to prevent violations of
federal law, conditional federal funding, conditional intellectual
Candidates Falling into the Open Arms of High Technology, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 1999, at Al.
158. Among the leading high-technology intellectual property lobbying or-
ganizations are the Business Software Alliance (BSA), the International Intel-
lectual Property Alliance (IIPA), the Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA), and, most recently, Technology Network (TechNet).
159. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Chew v.
California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston,
871 F.2d 166 (lst Cir. 1989); BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.
1988); Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988).
160. See Legislation: Draft Bill Would Restore Right to Sue States for In-
fringement, 58 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 806 (1999) (summa-
rizing bill proposed by Sen. Patrick Leahy).
June 2000] 1439
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
property rights, concurrent jurisdiction extending jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1498 to include actions against states, federal enforce-
ment, remedial legislation under paragraph 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and constitutional amendment.
Ex parte Young Actions. The Supreme Court's decision in
Seminole Tribe16 1 added a new wrinkle to the availability of relief in
federal court under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. Where a federal
statute contains comprehensive enforcement mechanisms inconsis-
tent with an injunctive remedy in federal court, then injunctive relief
under the doctrine of Ex parte Young is not available.162 Therefore,
Congress can enhance the viability of lawsuits brought by intellec-
tual property owners to enjoin infringement of the rights by states by
clarifying its intention to allow such remedial relief.
Conditional Funding. Congress has often used its spending
power to prod states to implement federal policies. For example,
Congress withholds federal highway and other funding from states
and state agencies failing to conform to federal pollution stan-
dards.163 The Supreme Court has upheld the use of conditions in
federal funding, even where the federal government arguably im-
pinges upon rights that the U.S. Constitution vests with the states.'
64
Conditional federal funding could be particularly useful to combat
infringement of federal intellectual property rights by state universi-
ties and research hospitals. The federal government-through the
National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, the
National Endowment for the Arts, the Department of Energy, the
Department of Defense, and other agencies-provides a substantial
proportion of research funding to state universities. Therefore, the
161. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
162. Id. at 73-76. See Meltzer, supra note 31, at 36-48.
163. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(2) (1999). See also Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 167 F.3d 641 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (holding that federal regulation permitting approval of transportation
project that appeared in previous conforming plan but did not appear in cur-
rently conforming plan violated Clean Air Act).
164. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal
statute withholding a portion of federal construction funds from states with
drinking ages below twenty-one). See generally Meltzer, supra note 31, at 51-
53 ("There is ... no single unconstitutional conditions doctrine: sometimes
conditions on the enjoyment of constitutional rights are tolerated and some-
times not, and no simple formula tells us which is which.").
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federal government could require that state entities respect federal
intellectual property rights in order to receive these funds. The fed-
eral government could also seek to obtain legislative waivers by the
states as a condition for their universities being eligible to receive
federal funding.
Conditional Intellectual Property Rights. In the Supreme
Court's College Savings Bank decision, Justice Scalia commented
that Congress may compel a waiver of sovereign immunity where a
state receives a "gift or gratuity" or "federal beneficence" that Con-
gress may rightfully withhold.165 Using this option, Senator Leahy
has proposed legislation that would require states to waive sovereign
immunity from suits that arise under federal intellectual property
laws as a condition for obtaining their own federal intellectual prop-
erty rights. 166 In his statement introducing the bill, Senator Leahy
noted that all fifty states own or have obtained patents and that some
states hold several hundred patents.167 Congress may not, however,
compel state waiver through inducements that are "so coercive as to
pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion""' 168 or ex-
clude the state from otherwise lawful activity. 169  It is unclear
whether this sort of waiver would be so disproportionate as to con-
stitute improper coercion.
70
Concurrent Jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright in-
fringement actions. Congress could amend this provision to
165. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,2231 (1999).
166. See Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835,
106th Cong. (1999), reprinted in 58 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 819.
167. See 150 Cong. Rec. S13,557 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1999) (remarks of Sen.
Leahy).
168. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 590 (1937)).
169. See College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2231.
170. Cf. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (chiding Congress for not limiting "the coverage
of the [Patent Remedy] Act to cases involving arguable constitutional viola-
tions, such as where a State refuses any state-court remedy for patent owners
whose patents it [violates]," or to "types of infringement, such as nonnegligent
infringement or infringement authorized pursuant to state policy").
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authorize state courts to hear infringement actions against states and
tailoring available remedies appropriately. States, however, could
thwart this means of circumventing the Florida Prepaid decisions.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Alden v. Maine,171 states
could preclude such suits by not waiving immunity to be sued in
their own courts for violations of federal intellectual property law.
Creating such concurrent jurisdiction would, at a minimum, force
some states to invoke sovereign immunity expressly. Those states
with open-ended waiver regimes' 72 would have to exempt such ac-
tions affirmatively, which could be politically unpopular.
This proposal could undermine the uniformity of the federal in-
tellectual property system by creating a parallel system of adjudica-
tion of intellectual property claims arising under federal law. 173 As
noted in Part I of this Article, however, states were rarely haled into
federal court when sovereign immunity did not stand in the way and
there are important social and political constraints upon state in-
fringement of federal intellectual property rights. In addition, even
though the Eleventh Amendment stands in the way of suits being
filed in federal court against states for infringement of intellectual
property rights without their consent, Congress could require that ap-
peals of state court adjudications of federal intellectual property
rights be heard exclusively in federal courts of appeal-with patent
appeals directed to the Federal Circuit and appeals of other intellec-
tual property cases channeled to the appropriate regional court of ap-
peals. This option would limit the extent to which state court sys-
tems would stray from federal court interpretation of intellectual
property law.
Federal/State Compromise. Part of the reason that states take
umbrage at the intellectual property remedy clarification acts is that
they expose states to greater potential liability than the federal
171. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
172. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
173. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-282, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989) (com-
menting that allowing state court adjudication of federal copyright claims
would frustrate the "essential premise" of the Copyright Act of 1976 "to create
a uniform Federal system for the creation and enforcement of copyrights").
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government for infringement of federal intellectual property rights. 1
74
The federal government is not liable for injunctive relief, treble dam-
ages for willful patent infringement, or more than the minimal statu-
tory damages, 175 whereas the remedy clarification acts sought to treat
states no differently than private actors, exposing them to the full
range and extent of remedies available in lawsuits against private in-
fringers. The federal government might able to achieve an adequate
and more politically viable result by expanding 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to
authorize suits against states on the same terms as those applicable to
the federal government. This approach respects the dignity of states
while providing intellectual property owners with an established
means of enforcing their rights in a federal forum. Furthermore,
given the distinctive character of public institutions,176 there is a
strong normative basis for not subjecting governmental entities to
punitive and intent-based remedies. Governments do not operate as
profit-oriented enterprises and are subject to freedom of information
requirements and open meeting laws that reduce the risk of unde-
tected infringement. As an inducement to states participating in this
regime (and formally waiving sovereign immunity), Congress could
couple this change with either the conditional funding 177 or condi-
tional intellectual property rights 178 proposals. Such a linkage would
be less likely to struck down as so disproportionate as to constitute
improper coercion.
Federal Enforcement. Because the Eleventh Amendment does
not immunize states from lawsuits by the United States in federal
court, Congress could develop a new mechanism for enforcing fed-
eral intellectual property rights against states. For example, Con-
gress could enact a regime authorizing federal authorities to enforce
federal intellectual property rights against states and state entities.
174. See Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity, 73 UNIV. SO. CAL. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2000).
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (limiting patent and copyright recovery to "rea-
sonable and entire compensation" including minimum statutory damages in the
case of copyright infringement); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (addressing costs
and fees).
176. See supra Part I.B.
177. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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Under this regime, intellectual property owners could petition the
U.S. Department of Justice to initiate law suits seeking relief-in-
junctions and damages-against states. A separate provision could
enable the intellectual property owner to recover any monetary
awards paid to the federal government. This procedure would obvi-
ously be cumbersome. It is unlikely, however, that it would be in-
voked with great frequency. In addition, it could be limited by al-
lowing an appropriate federal official, such as the Director of the
Patent and Trademark Office, to decide whether to pursue a particu-
lar petition.
An alternative means of achieving this result could be through
the use of a qui tam regime. The qui tam model enables private indi-
viduals to vindicate the rights of the government.179 It might be pos-
sible to reconceptualize private intellectual property rights to allow
for government vindication of those rights. One further step would
be to then allow private individuals to bring suits to vindicate such
rights on behalf of the federal government. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the Supreme Court is currently considering whether states
are persons under the False Claims Act and if so, whether states have
immunity from qui tam suits brought under that Act.1
8 0
Remedial Legislation. The Supreme Court's Florida Prepaid
decision substantially raised the bar for congressional abrogation of
state sovereign immunity pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but it did not preclude this option entirely. Intellectual
property owners will need to adduce much more substantial evidence
of state infringement of federal intellectual property rights, both in
terms of the number of violations and the willfulness of the viola-
tions, in order to justify congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity,18 1  as well as evidence that state remedies are
179. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (authorizing private individual to bring a
civil action on the government's behalf to remedy false claims against the fed-
eral government).
180. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Jonathan Stevens, 162 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391
(1999).
181. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)) (suggesting that the legislative record would have to
establish "a history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional
rights' of the sort Congress had faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 leg-
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inadequate. 182 The Supreme Court did not establish a clear threshold
for when this burden is met, but it did suggest that evidence of inten-
tional violations of federal intellectual property rights would be im-
portant in making the determination. 183 For the reasons discussed
above, 184 state infringement might never rise to the level necessary to
justify remedial legislation. And even if a pattern of patent in-
fringement could be demonstrated, intellectual property owners
would also have to demonstrate that state remedies were inadequate.
Thus, in order for Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
intellectual property owners would have to establish, through moni-
toring and unsuccessful efforts to obtain remedies through state legal
and administrative processes, both a substantial pattern of state in-
fringement and the lack of adequate state remedies. And even then,
Congress could only abrogate sovereign immunity to the extent nec-
essary to remedy the constitutional violation.
185
Constitutional Amendment. The clearest way to abrogate sover-
eign immunity for state infringement of federal intellectual property
rights would be through a constitutional amendment. This approach,
however, would face insuperable obstacles. In the entire history of
the United States, the complex process of amending the Constitution
has only been successfully used to override Supreme Court decisions
on four or five occasions. 186 It is unlikely that sufficient support
could be garnered to place this issue on the level of prior constitu-
tional amendments. Even if two-thirds of the Congress were to sup-
port such a constitutional amendment, it is doubtful that many states
would rush to ratify it.' 
87
islation").
182. See id. at 2207-08.
183. See id. at 2209 (noting that "a state actor's negligent act that causes
unintended injury to a person's property does not 'deprive' that person of
property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause").
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2210 (suggesting that Congress could
not abrogate sovereign immunity with regard to negligent infringement, nor of
states with adequate remedies or low incidence of infringement).
186. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 64-65 n. 10
(2d ed. 1988).
187. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring ratification of constitutional amend-
ments by three-fourths of the states).
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The viability of these various approaches depends upon the ex-
tent of the problem, the salience of the issue, and the political
strength of the states in resisting such efforts. Intellectual property
owners can exert direct pressure upon legislators through lobbying
and campaign financing. They can also bring attention to the prob-
lems of state infringement by monitoring the behavior of state enti-
ties, bringing high-profile lawsuits, and waging public relations cam-
paigns against states that do not respect federal intellectual property
rights. The efficacy of these efforts, however, will depend signifi-
cantly upon the extent of the problem. If states and state entities do
not engage in widespread or otherwise significant acts of infringe-
ment, then the opportunity to catalyze the political process will be
modest. As the seriousness of the problem escalates, however, so
will the viability of more substantial political responses. In this way,
political constraints tighten as the magnitude of the problem rises.
In the most likely scenario, states will continue to respect federal
intellectual property rights and infringements of these rights by state
actors will be unintentional, episodic, and relatively rare. Where in-
fringement occurs, the Florida Prepaid decisions present a challenge
and opportunity for intellectual property lawyers to test the efficacy
and limits of Exparte Young, § 1983, and takings actions in the fed-
eral courts. In addition, they will likely be able to pursue state in-
verse condemnation actions and possibly tort, state intellectual prop-
erty, or contract claims, many of which are largely untested in most
of the states. In those areas in which states or state entities cross the
infringement line more systematically, the Florida Prepaid decisions
present challenges to business strategists to develop safeguards
against state infringement-whether through trade secrecy, technical
solutions (e.g., encryption, anti-circumvention technologies), and
new contracting approaches. Should states cavalierly infringe fed-
eral intellectual property rights, then intellectual property owners
will likely organize political campaigns at the state and federal levels
in order to combat abuses through a range of approaches including
direct involvement in state politics, waiver, and the use of contingen-
cies in federal funding of programs and research. In addition, they
will seek (and already are seeking) creative federal legislative means
for filling the gap created by the Florida Prepaid decisions. And if
state infringement of federal intellectual property rights surpass the
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rather vague threshold suggested in Florida Prepaid,188 Congress has
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sover-
eign immunity directly. 
189
In view of the multiplicity of institutional constraints upon state
infringement of federal intellectual property rights, the Florida Pre-
paid decisions are likely to have more of a symbolic than substantive
impact on state policies respecting intellectual property rights. Yet
in a few areas-such as the use of patented research methods in basic
research conducted at state universities-state institutions may toe
and possibly cross the line. Here, the narrow experimental use ex-
ception of the federal patent system may undermine innovation by
hindering basic research of the type that is the hallmark of university
research. 190 Although the increasingly commercial character of state
university research may alter this assessment, the effect of greater
leeway for universities to engage in basic research without concern
for patent licensing arguably will have an ambiguous or positive im-
pact on progress in biomedical and other areas of scientific research.
This is not to say, however, that the Supreme Court's rulings in
the Florida Prepaid cases do not impose real costs upon some intel-
lectual property owners, complicate the enforcement of intellectual
property rights, and as a result undermine the promotion of science
and the useful arts. The uncertainty and cost of enforcing intellectual
property rights against states will discourage those with smaller
stakes from pursuing relief and will raise the costs for those seeking
relief. In addition, the constraints on enforcement will raise the costs
of contracting and monitoring transactions with state entities. Over-
all, however, the net effects of the Florida Prepaid decisions on the
incentives for creative activities are unlikely to be large and several
188. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2206-11.
189. A constitutional amendment abrogating state sovereign immunity with
respect to federal intellectual property infringement actions (or authorizing
Congress to abrogate such immunity) remains a last resort, but with daunting
odds. The U.S. Constitution is rarely amended, and this issue is neither press-
ing nor compelling to the states. It is difficult to imagine two-thirds of the
states consenting to reduce their sovereign immunity, particularly over an issue
such as this one.
190. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclu-
sive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017 (1989); Arti Kaur
Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
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redundant systems for protecting intellectual property and self-
correcting features of the intellectual property system will limit the
exposure of intellectual property owners to the gap opened up by the
Florida Prepaid decisions.
I. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FLORIDA PREPAID
DECISIONS
Although various institutional constraints will likely prevent or
at least substantially restrain states from infringing federal intellec-
tual property rights in significant or pervasive ways, the Supreme
Court's Florida Prepaid decisions pose potential problems for the
United States in several international arenas. The rise of digital
technologies, advancements in transportation technologies, and re-
ductions in trade barriers have dramatically increased international
trade flow.191 Industries based upon new technologies and whose
value is derived significantly from intellectual property have spurred
American exports. American entertainment industries, software and
computer manufacturing companies, and pharmaceutical companies
derive substantial and growing proportions of their revenue streams
from their export operations and comprise a growing share of U.S.
exports. These products, however, are vulnerable to low cost dupli-
cation in countries lacking intellectual property protections or effec-
tive enforcement mechanisms. The concerns of intellectual property
owners with regard to international piracy has, over the past two dec-
ades, led the United States to pursue an increasingly more assertive
role in promoting the adoption of intellectual property protections
throughout the world, the harmonization of international protection
for intellectual property, and improvement of global institutions gov-
erning intellectual property rights. 192  The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, for which the
United States aggressively lobbied, established minimum criteria for
191. See Jerome H. Reichman, The TRIPs Component of the GATT's Uru-
guay Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an
Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171
(1993).
192. See RYAN, supra note 156, at chs. 4 & 7.
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intellectual property regimes. Furthermore, the United States has
forcefully objected to perceived weaknesses in the intellectual prop-
erty laws of other nations. By opening a constitutional loophole of
debatable scope in the U.S. intellectual property regime, the Supreme
Court's recent decisions raise serious questions regarding U.S. com-
pliance with international accords and undermine the credibility of
the United States in international intellectual property diplomacy.
A. Compliance with International Accords
Over the past decade, the United States has actively built con-
sensus for the establishment of new multilateral agreements for the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. TRIPs
and NAFTA are particularly important in that they have relatively
strong and effective dispute resolution mechanisms. Unlike many
prior international agreements regarding intellectual property, these
newer agreements establish relatively clear minimum standards for
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. The
Florida Prepaid decisions, by striking down congressional abroga-
tion of state sovereign immunity from direct infringement actions in
federal courts, expose the United States to claims that it has failed to
comply with these international accords.
1. Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs)
agreement'
93
United States trade diplomats used trade negotiations at the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), begun in 1986, to bring intellectual property protections
into trade negotiations. By linking tariff reductions on apparel and
agricultural goods with universal minimum standards of intellectual
property protection, developed nations were able to persuade devel-
oping nations to accede to the TRIPs agreement.
194
193. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs Agreement].
194. See Michael E. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property
Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
465 (1994). Articles 65 and 66 of the TRIPs agreement provide for a transi-
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Part II of the TRIPs agreement establishes minimum standards
concerning the availability, scope, and use of intellectual property
rights. It covers copyright and related rights, trademarks, industrial
designs, patents, and integrated circuit designs. Under each section,
the agreement limits the exceptions which member nations may en-
act. With regard to copyright and related rights, "Members shall
confine limitations or exceptions to the exclusive rights to certain
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and do not necessarily prejudice the legitimate interests of the
right holder."' '95
Similar provisions apply to trademarks196 and patents.197 Article
31 provides for a limited exception for government use without
authorization of the right holder: "[S]uch use may only be permitted
if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms
and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within
a reasonable time."198 Article 31 allows members to dispense with
such efforts in circumstances of national emergency, exigency, or
cases of public noncommercial use. In all cases, however, the mem-
ber state must notify the right holder as soon as "reasonably practi-
cable."'199 Article 31 further provides that "the right holder shall be
paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking
into account the economic value of the authorization." 200 The legal
validity of such authorization must be subject to judicial review.
Part HI of the TRIPs agreement provides for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights. Article 41 states that
1. Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as
specified in this Part are available under their law so as to
permit effective action against any act of infringement of
tional period for developing nations. Article 67 requires developed countries
to provide technical assistance to developing countries in the drafting of intel-
lectual property laws and regulations.
195. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 193, art. 13.
196. See id. art. 17 (trademarks), art. 24 (applying to geographical indica-
tions).
197. See id. art. 30.
198. Id. art. 31.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, in-
cluding expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringe-
ment. These procedures shall be applied in such a manner
as to avoid creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to
provide for safeguards against their abuse.
2. Procedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual
property rights shall be fair and equitable. They shall not
be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreason-
able time-limits or unwarranted delays .... 201
Article 41 further requires that members provide an opportunity for
judicial review. TRIPs also establishes minimum criteria for reme-
dies. Article 44 requires that judicial officers have authority to order
injunctive relief (including desist orders).202 Article 45 requires that
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order
the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to
compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered be-
cause of an infringement of that person's intellectual prop-
erty right by an infringer who knowingly, or with reason-
able grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity.
2. The judicial authorities shall also have the authority to
order the infringer to pay the right holder expenses, which
203may include appropriate attorney's fees ....
Article 46 requires that judicial authorities have the power to order
that infringing goods, materials, and implements used predominately
in the creation of infringing goods be seized and appropriately re-
moved from commerce. 20 4 Article 61 requires members to apply
criminal procedures and penalties in the cases of wilful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.
20 5
The World Trade Organization, which succeeds the GATT,
oversees implementation of the TRIPs agreement. Under the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding, members of TRIPs may initiate
proceedings against other members for failure to implement TRIPs
201. Id. art. 41.
202. See id. art. 44.
203. Id. art. 45.
204. See id. art. 46.
205. See id. art. 61.
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requirements. 206 It is unclear whether a member may obtain a rem-
edy against another member for a single breach of the obligation to
provide effective enforcement or only for systemic failures.20 7 In
any case, immunity of states and state entities from infringement of
federal intellectual property rights would appear to qualify as a basis
for a remedy.
The United States could defend its system on the ground that
state officers may, under certain circumstances, be liable under the
Exparte Young doctrine for prospective injunctive relief and under §
1983 for damages. In addition, alternative remedies in state courts
may be available. It is questionable whether this hodge podge of
potential remedies would satisfy TRIPs's minimum criteria. Even
before the Florida Prepaid decisions, it is questionable whether the
United States fully adhered to Article 31 with regard to notification
of patent owners that their inventions were being used by govern-
ment entities. 0 8 Following the Florida Prepaid decisions, enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights against states would fall below
this Article 31 criteria. In addition, it is questionable whether states
would provide adequate or timely remedies for infringements.
TRIPs does not contain any exceptions based upon the distinc-
tively American approach to state sovereignty and federalism. The
limitations on enforcement would appear to conflict with normal
206. See Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AND THE GATT-WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 415 (E.U.
Petersmann ed., 1997).
207. Id.
208. The European Communities have noted that:
Under U.S. law (28 US Code Section 1498) a patent owner may not
enjoin or recover damages on the basis of his patents for infringements
due to the manufacture or use of goods by or for the US Government
Authorities. This practice is particularly frequent in the activities of
the [Department of Defense] but is also extremely widespread in prac-
tically all government departments. For obvious reasons this practice
is particularly detrimental to foreign right-holders because they will
generally not be able to detect governmental use and are thus very
likely to miss the opportunity to initiate the administrative claims pro-
cedure.
European Commission, Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Invest-
ment § 6.1 (1997).
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exploitation of intellectual property works and would prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder.
Member states of international accords do not typically proceed
against other member states on the basis of each and every perceived
inconsistency or violation of international agreements. Nations re-
solve to examine a broad range of foreign trade and other diplomatic
considerations in deciding whether and how to pursue the enforce-
ment of international law provisions. To put this in perspective, after
an exhaustive review, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) has concluded that no foreign nation satisfies all of the
minimum criteria set forth in the TRIPs agreement. 20 9 Yet the more
vulnerable the United States is to claims of noncompliance, the
greater its exposure to enforcement actions and the more difficulty it
will face in seeking trade and other concessions from other nations.
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement
As part of its multifaceted strategy to strengthen intellectual
property rights throughout the world, the United States pushed for
the inclusion of intellectual property protections in its regional trade
agreement with Canada and Mexico. NAFTA provides that "Each
party shall provide in its territory to the nationals of another Party
adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights, while ensuring that measures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade."210 Article 1714 states that "each Party shall ensure that en-
forcement procedures ... are available under its domestic law so as
to permit effective action to be taken against any act of infringement
of intellectual property rights, . . . including expeditious remedies to
prevent infringements and remedies to deter further infringe-
ments. ' 21 Each member state is to "ensure that its procedures for
the enforcement of intellectual property rights are fair and equitable,
are not unnecessarily complicated or costly, and do not entail
209. See USTR Fact Sheets on Super 301 Trade Liberalization Priorities and
Special 301 on Intellectual Property, 6 INT'L TRADE RPTR. (BNA) 715, 719
(1989).
210. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., art. 1701, 32 I.L.M. 289, at § 1 [hereinafter NAFTA].
211. Id. art. 174.
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unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. 212 NAFTA allows
parties to provide "limited exceptions to the exclusive rights con-
ferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unrea-
sonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
into account the legitimate interests of other persons. 21 3
The NAFTA language largely tracks the TRIPs provisions. A
signatory's authority to make exceptions are similarly limited.
NAFTA focuses more narrowly upon the protection of intellectual
property rights of foreign nationals and not the integrity of the over-
all intellectual property regime. Canada and Mexico would be able
to challenge the United States regime to the extent that states and
state entities are beyond the effective and timely reach of foreign in-
tellectual property owners.
3. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty
The United States also played a substantial role in the develop-
ment of the WIPO Copyright Treaty which, like TRIPs and NAFTA,
required signatory nations to establish minimum criteria for the pro-
tection of intellectual property works. In addition to reaffirming
parties' adherence to the Beme Convention, the WIPO Copyright
Treaty obligates signatories "to provide adequate legal protection
against the circumvention of effective technological measures that
are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights
under this Treaty or the Berne Convention ..... , 214 Article 12 obli-
gates contracting parties to "provide adequate and effective legal
remedies against any person knowingly performing" acts which they
212. Id.
213. Id. art. 1709, § 6. NAFTA has similar limitations on exceptions for
copyright, see id. art. 1705, § 5 ("Each Party shall confine limitations or ex-
ceptions to the rights provided for in this Article to certain special cases that do
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder."); sound recordings, see
id. art. 1706, § 3 (same as copyright); and trademarks, see id. art. 1708, § 12
("A Party may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trade-
mark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take
into account the legitimate interests of the trademark owner and of other per-
sons.").
214. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17,
at 10 (1997).
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have reason to know will "induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an in-
fringement of any right covered by this treaty or the Berne Conven-
tion."2 15 The United States amended its copyright law in 1998 to
implement this treaty.
216
The only exception within the WIPO Copyright Treaty is rather
narrow:
Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, pro-
vide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to
authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty in
certain special cases that do no conflict with a normal ex-
ploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the author.
217
As with TRIPs and NAFTA, the exception here would not justify
immunity for states and state entities. The principal defense would
have to be that alternative legal and administrative remedies are sub-
stantially equivalent to direct infringement actions under the Copy-
right Act.
B. Intellectual Property Diplomacy
In response to mounting trade deficits, Congress enacted the
Trade Act of 1974,218 which revised the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 to allow the President to restrict imports from countries that
had unreasonably restricted U.S. exports. Section 301 authorizes the
President to retaliate against foreign countries for engaging in "un-
fair" trade practices, even if such practices had not been found to
contravene international law.219  The United States used this
215. Id. at 11.
216. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1999)).
217. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 215, art. 10(1).
218. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 301-306, 88 Stat. 1978
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1994)).
219. Section 301 authorizes domestic industries to petition the U.S. Trade
Representative to investigate allegations of unfair trade practices limiting U.S.
exports. In addition, the USTR may initiate its own investigations. After in-
vestigation and consultation with relevant foreign country representatives, the
USTR determines whether United States trade agreement rights have been
violated or whether the foreign country has engaged in unfair trade practices.
The Trade Act requires that remedies be implemented if trade rights are denied
or if unjustifiable trade practices are found. The Trade Act allows the USTR
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unilateral power in bilateral interactions to pressure foreign nations
to adopt more liberal trade practices and as part of a concerted effort
to achieve multilateral agreements.
2 20
By the early 1980s, American businesses relying heavily upon
intellectual property rights mobilized their forces to focus U.S. trade
policy on piracy of intellectual property abroad. 1  In 1984, Con-
gress amended the Trade Act to expressly authorize retaliation
against nations failing to protect and enforce intellectual property
rights.222 Congress further strengthened the hand of U.S. trade ne-
gotiators through the passage of the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988.223 In a set of provisions that have come to be
known as "Special 301,,,224 Congress directed the USTR to develop
an annual list of "priority" countries that "have the most onerous or
egregious acts, policies, or practices that (i) deny adequate and ef-
fective intellectual property rights, or (ii) deny fair and equitable
market access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual
property protection."2 25 The USTR must investigate these nations'
practices and may take action. If the investigation reveals that the
priority list country has denied U.S. rights and has not made progress
in remedying these problems within eighteen months of the initiation
of the investigation, then the President must pursue responsive ac-
tion.
226
discretion to recommend remedies where it finds unreasonable or discrimina-
tory trade practices.
220. See Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third
World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Frame-
work, 22 CAN. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989).
221. See RYAN, supra note 156, at 167-72.
222. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 295 (1979);
Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 304, 306, 98 Stat. 3002 (1984). The 1984 Act also ex-
panded the scope of the Trade Act to include services.
223. Pub. L. No. 100-48, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended in various
sections of 19 U.S.C.).
224. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301 ": Its Require-
ments, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (1989-
90); Brian Mark Berliner, Making Intellectual Property Pirates Walk the
Plank: Using "Special 301 " to Protect the United States' Rights, 12 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 725 (1990).
225. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(A) (1999).
226. See id. §§ 2411(a), 2414(a).
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The USTR has implemented Special 301 law with particular
zeal. Its priority list documents in significant detail a tremendous
number of impediments to the protection of intellectual property
rights of U.S. domestic industries in foreign nations.227 Substantially
228
every trading partner comes under scrutiny. The USTR has
opened more than one hundred investigations, many in the past dec-
ade focusing on allegations that trading partners deny adequate and
effective intellectual property rights.
Two prominent efforts by the USTR to push for stronger intel-
lectual property rights in foreign countries illustrate the ways in
which the Florida Prepaid decisions could potentially undermine
U.S. credibility in foreign trade and intellectual property diplomacy.
The first involves a protracted dispute with the People's Republic of
China focusing on piracy of copyrighted works. The second, of
more recent vintage, involves a new South Africa law providing the
Minister of Health with discretion in expanding the dissemination of
pharmaceutical products.
The USTR listed China on its 1989 Special 301 priority list
based on complaints by the International Intellectual Property Alli-
ance and others that China tolerated widespread piracy of copy-
righted books, films, music, and software. 22 9 Numerous factories in
southern China were producing millions of compact and laser discs
for distribution throughout Asia. U.S. copyright owners alleged
that the government was actively involved in pirating intellectual
property through government corruption. 231 The USTR instituted a
formal Section 301 investigation in 1991 and has been actively en-
gaged in efforts to address gaps in China's intellectual property re-
gime throughout the 1990s.
2 32
227. See U.S. Trade Representative, 1999 National Trade Estimate (visited
Mar. 26, 2000) <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/1999>.
228. See U.S. Trade Representative, Section 301 Table of Cases (last modi-
fied Aug. 9, 1999) <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/301report/act30 1.htm>.
229. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, TRADE
LOSSES DUE TO PIRACY AND OTHER MARKET ACCESS BARRIERS AFFECTING
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES 57-66 (Apr. 1989).
230. See RYAN, supra note 156, at 80.
231. See id. at81.
232. See id. at 81-84.
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The perception that states and state entities within the United
States have immunity from infringement liability for violation of in-
tellectual property rights could provide China and other centrally
planned economies with a simple and rhetorically effective response
to U.S. efforts to close down pirate factories abroad. These countries
could merely mimic U.S. law. As discussed in Part I, federal and
state law provide numerous avenues of legal recourse against in-
fringement of federal intellectual property rights by states and state
entities. Furthermore, it is unlikely that states will engage in system-
atic infringement of federal intellectual property rights. These reali-
ties, however, do not necessarily carry the day in the rough and tum-
ble world of international trade politics. China or other centrally
planned economies could emulate state sovereignty and provide
cumbersome and largely ineffective state remedies, all the while
claiming they have the same substantive law as the United States. In
the end, diplomacy efforts depend on a broad range of factors. Yet
erosion of legal and moral high ground does not enhance the effec-
tiveness of U.S. trade negotiators.
A recent trade intellectual property dispute with South Africa
further illustrates the way in which state sovereign immunity inter-
acts with trade relations. In an effort to respond to an AIDS epi-
demic affecting a substantial proportion of its population,233 South
Africa amended its Medicines and Related Substances Control Act in
1997 to authorize the Minister of Health to order compulsory licens-
ing and parallel importation of pharmaceuticals.2 34 The pharmaceu-
tical industry considered the vague and open-ended authority of this
law to be a serious threat to the protection of intellectual property
rights.2 35 The United States called on the South African government
to "bring its IPR [intellectual property rights] regime into full com-
pliance with TRIPS before the January 1, 2000 deadline ...and
233. See Hanging on to the Profits from AIDS; Sufferers in Africa Are
Threatened by Sanctions Against Cheap Drugs, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 5,
1999, at 18; Minister Predicts Six Million South Africans with HIV (visited
June 5, 2000) <http://www.cnn.com/world/africa/9908/25/bc-AIDS-
SAFRICA.reut>.
234. See Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of
1997, 3 JSRSA § 1 (1998).
235. See Claire Bisseker, Cheaper Medicine at a Price * Health Policy, FIN.
MAIL (S. AFR.), Oct. 17, 1997, at 36.
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clarify that the powers granted in the Medicines Act are consistent
with its international obligations and will not be used to weaken or
abrogate pharmaceutical patent protection., 236 Yet under a regime of
state sovereign immunity, pharmaceutical companies could not bring
direct patent infringement actions against state hospitals that pirated
patented drugs. As explained in Part I, such a policy or action is un-
likely to be adopted, and if it were to be pursued, various avenues of
legal recourse remain available to patent holders to enjoin such ac-
tion and seek recompense. Nonetheless, the fact remains that it
would not be through a direct infringement action and would en-
counter substantial procedural and substantive obstacles to expedi-
tious, full, and fair relief. As a result, South Africa and other nations
that adopt more lax intellectual property policies may be able to
counter U.S. diplomacy to tighten their intellectual property regimes.
The argument can be made that United States intellectual prop-
erty trade diplomacy often reflects a narrow view of intellectual
property issues shaped principally by the interests of U.S. intellectual
property owners. 237 While it may well be the case that special inter-
ests have had disproportionate influence in setting the U.S. diplo-
matic agenda, the solution to that problem lies in improving cam-
paign finance, ethics in government, limits on post-government
lobbying, and related laws designed to ensure balanced and objective
representation and discourage capture of government decision-
making processes. It should not be through undermining the effec-
tiveness of foreign diplomacy. The issue raised by state sovereign
immunity from liability for infringement of intellectual property
rights relates principally to whether the United States should have a
unified and effective voice in its foreign relations activities. The
236. See Helaine Klasky, USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual
Review, (visited Apr. 30, 1999) <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/O4/99-
41.html>; see also United States Department of State, U.S. Government Efforts
to Negotiate the Repeal, Termination or Withdrawal of Article 15(c) of the
South African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1997 (visited Jan. 21,
2000) <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/stdept-feb51999.html>.
237. See Pamela Samuelson, The Digital Agenda of the World Intellectual
Property Organization: Principal Paper: The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO,
37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997); RYAN, supra note 156; October 6, 1999 letter to
Charlene Barshefsky regarding review of U.S. trade policy as it relates to ac-
cess to essential drugs (visited Apr. 1, 2000)
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/country/cb-oct6-99.html>.
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Florida Prepaid decisions undermine such authority by potentially
putting beyond the reach of the federal government the ability to im-
plement a fair and effective system of intellectual property protection
and enforcement. This problem will become more acute as intellec-
tual property becomes an increasingly international issue. As the
China and South Africa examples illustrate, state sovereign immu-
nity represents a potentially enormous loophole in the development
of a truly global system of protection for intellectual property. Thus,
the Supreme Court's opening of a state immunity gap within the fed-
eral intellectual property enforcement scheme may have significant
adverse long-term effects on the climate for innovation in the United
States by undermining the federal government's credibility in intel-
lectual property diplomacy efforts.
C. International Treaty Obligations and Foreign Relations as Bases
for Congressional Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity for
Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights
These threats to international diplomacy provide an alternative
basis within established constitutional principles on which to justify
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity for infringe-
ment of federal intellectual property rights. The Necessary and
Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to enact
legislation implementing foreign treaties ratified by the United
States.238 Because state sovereignty has never been understood to
extend to international affairs,239 the Eleventh Amendment would not
238. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416, 432 (1920); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1901); Martin
S. Flaherty, Are We to be a Nation?: Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in
Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1278 (1999); Thomas Healy, Note, Is
Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1726 (1998); cf Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958)
(noting that although the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress
authority to regulate foreign affairs, "there can be no doubt of the existence of
this power in the law-making organ of the Nation"); United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (stating that the powers of
the United States to conduct foreign affairs do not derive from the Constitu-
tion, but are inherent from the sovereignty of the nation).
239. See Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30, 31 (1962) ("The Constitution
by Art. I, § 10, imposes severe limitations on the several States' power to af-
fect the foreign relations of the United States.").
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appear to limit this aspect of Congress's Article I powers. 240 There-
fore, Congress could plausibly justify a re-enactment of the intellec-
tual property remedy clarification acts as implementing U.S. treaty
obligations under TRIPs, NAFTA, and the WIPO Copyright
Treaty.
241
Although NAFTA and TRIPs were approved as Congressional-
Executive Agreements 242 (requiring simple majorities of both
240. It could be argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Florida Prepaid
holds that Congress lacks authority under Article I to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. The Court states that
In Seminole Tribe, of course, this Court overruled the plurality in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 109 (1989), our only prior
case finding congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign im-
munity to an Article I power (the Commerce Clause). 517 U.S., at 72-
73. Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the Patent
Remedy Act cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or
the Patent Clause. Id.
119 S. Ct. at 2205. This language is merely restating Seminole Tribe, which
did not distinguish among the differences among Article I clauses with respect
to state sovereignty. States possessed sovereignty with regard to domestic af-
fairs (as would be relevant to the Commerce Clause and the Patent Clause), but
not foreign affairs. These powers have always resided at the national level.
Therefore, it would not be appropriate to read Florida Prepaid as precluding
Congress from abrogating the States' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immu-
nity under its treaty or foreign relation powers. Cf Zschemig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429 (1968) (striking down, under the Supremacy Clause on the basis of
foreign relations considerations, an Oregon statute that would have denied in-
heritance to East German heirs because the recipients could not establish that
East Germany provided reciprocal inheritance rights for Americans and would
not confiscate foreign heirs' rights to the proceeds of the Oregon bequest);
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, No. 99-474, 2000 WL 775550
(June 19, 2000) (striking down, under the Supremacy Clause on the basis of
foreign relations considerations, a Massachusetts statute prohibiting state enti-
ties from doing business with U.S. or foreign companies doing business with
Myanmar (which the legislation refers to as Burma)).
241. Professor Gerald Neuman has argued that the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act of 1993, struck down in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), could be similarly resuscitated by re-enactment on the grounds that it
implements U.S. treaty obligations under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA,
14 CONST. COMMENTARY 33,49-54 (1997).
242. See NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057
(1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (1994)); Uruguay Round Agreements
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Houses) and not through formal treaty ratification (requiring assent
by two-thirds of the Senate),243 the Supreme Court has recognized
that the federal government may regulate foreign affairs independent
of its treaty powers 244 and that Congressional-Executive Agreements
pass constitutional muster.245  Such Congressional-Executive
Agreements have been widely used as an alternative to formal trea-
ties during the past 60 years, 246 particularly in trade-related mat-
ters. 247 Even though Congress did not incorporate the terms of
NAFTA and TRJPs directly into federal law,248 these agreements are
binding under international law.249  Furthermore, the federal
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3511
(1994)).
243. See U.S. CONST., Art. IX, § 2.
244. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
245. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (stating that
international agreements, like treaties, are to be given supremacy over state
law); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318; Made in the USA Foundation v. United
States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (upholding constitutionality of
NAFTA). See generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Con-
stitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 801 (1995) (arguing that Congressional-
Executive Agreements are valid). But see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221 (1995) (questioning the constitutionality of
Congressional-Executive Agreements in some circumstances); David M.
Golove, Against Free-form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998) (re-
sponding to Tribe's analysis).
246. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 245, at 802-03; Myres S. McDou-
gal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J.
181 (1945); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congresional-
Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of Na-
tional Policy: II, 54 YALE L.J. 534 (1945).
247. See LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
218 (1996).
248. Both implementing statutes express that no state law or its application
may be declared invalid on the ground that the provision is inconsistent with
the international agreement, except in an action brought for such purpose by
the United States. See NAFTA Implementation Act, § 102(b)(2), 107 Stat. at
2063; Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 102(b)(2)(A), 108 Stat. at 4817.
249. See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-
Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60,
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government possesses authority under its foreign affairs power to
override state law in order to effectuate these international agree-
ments.
The reliance upon international treaty obligations and exclusive
federal foreign relations powers as a basis for overriding state sover-
eign immunity for infringement of federal intellectual property rights
finds support in the increasing globalization of markets for goods and
services built upon intellectual property rights. It is essential for
many companies to develop international if not global intellectual
property right portfolios. Copyright protection is already global,250
and the Patent Cooperation Treaty251 as well as improvements in in-
ternational patent institutions25z have moved the world toward a
more unified system. The Internet is rapidly expanding the interna-
tional exchange of intellectual property and increasing the signifi-
cance of and conflict over patent, copyright, and trademark rights.
2 5 3
The ease with which copyrighted and patented works can be dis-
seminated and infringed over the Internet support the need for strong
federal authority in governing intellectual property policies.
2 5 4
61 (1997) (noting that a U.S. court is "bound to utilize international law obli-
gations in its interpretation of national law"); see also The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that "international law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination").
250. The Berne Convention, which has been ratified by many of the world's
nations, eliminates copyright formalities for foreign authors. See Beme Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 art.5.
251. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645 (1970) (rati-
fied in the U.S. 1975).
252. See generally ARPAD BOGSCH, THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE
PATENT COOPERATION TREATY: 1970-1995 (1995); RYAN, supra note 151, at
128-32.
253. See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringe-
ment on Global Computer Networks, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1993); MARK A.
LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW (2000).
254. The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a coalition rep-
resenting U.S. copyright-based industries, monitors and reports on the extent of
piracy of copyrighted works throughout the world. IIPA estimates interna-
tional piracy losses to U.S. copyright-based industries in 1995 of $18 to $20
billion. See Letter from Eric H. Smith, president of IIPA, to Joseph Papovich,
Acting Assistant USTR for Services Investment and Intellectual Property (vis-
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Much of the phenomenal growth of the United States economy
over the past decade has been attributable to new information tech-
nologies.255 Exports having significant intellectual property content
now account for over twenty-five percent of the U.S. total, a signifi-
cant rise over any prior period in U.S. history.256 The information
technology sector of the U.S. economy has steadily increased its
share of the gross domestic product throughout the 1990s and shows
no sign of slowing down. These patterns can be seen throughout the
global economy.257 This vital sector of the United States economy
has benefited directly from the expansion of intellectual property
rights throughout the world. In order to sustain this growth, it is in-
creasingly important that the United States both comply with inter-
national law and maintain the credibility to pressure other nations to
do the same. These developments bolster the importance for the
United States of fostering uniform minimum standards for the pro-
tection and enforcement of intellectual property rights throughout the
world. Congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity for in-
fringement of federal intellectual property rights directly supports
adherence to U.S. treaty obligations and the pursuit of foreign rela-
tions goals.
IL. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Atascadero State Hospi-
tal v. Scanlon258 that Congress must "mak[e] its intention unmistaka-
bly clear in the language of the statute" to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity set in motion a chain of judicial actions and
legislative reactions. Applying this standard, several appellate
ited Feb. 16, 2000) <http://www.iipa.com/html/rbispecial_301_lttr_
22096.html>; see also R. MICHAEL GADBAW & TIMOTHY J. RICHARDS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?
3 (1988) (estimating piracy of U.S. intellectual property rights of $25 billion
per year in the mid-to late-1980s).
255. See U.S. COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, THE EMERGING DIGITAL
ECONOMY 11 (1999).
256. See GADBAW & RICHARDS, supra note 254, at 4.
257. See The Importance of Being American: U.S. Dominance in the Com-
puter Software Industry: A Survey of the Software Industry, ECONOMIST, May
25, 1996, at S14.
258. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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courts259 ruled that Congress had not evinced such an intent in the
federal copyright and patent laws and therefore dismissed infringe-
ment actions against states or state entities. Although there was rela-
tively little evidence that states or state entities had systematically or
even significantly infringed federal intellectual property rights, Con-
gress enacted the intellectual property remedy clarification acts to
protect against that risk and to promote a uniform federal intellectual
property system.
However, in a parallel constitutional law development, the Su-
preme Court narrowed the circumstances under which Congress
could abrogate state sovereign immunity.260  Therefore, when the
validity of two of the intellectual property remedy clarification acts
came up for review last year, the Supreme Court raised the bar
against direct enforcement of state infringement of federal intellec-
tual property in federal courts quite a bit higher. Since that time, the
Fifth Circuit has struck down the third of the remedy clarification
acts. These decisions, while of some symbolic significance, are not
likely to change state policies respecting federal intellectual property
rights. The Florida Prepaid decisions may somewhat alter the bar-
gaining dynamic of states and intellectual property owners in a few
areas such as public university research, but a broad array of legal,
market, social, and political constraints will likely discourage states
and state actors from becoming intellectual property pirates.
Perhaps the greatest risks of the Florida Prepaid decisions lie in
their implications for the further development of a strong and en-
forceable international intellectual property regime. The United
States has aggressively lobbied international institutions and other
nations to adopt strong and comprehensive intellectual property laws.
This policy has enhanced the revenues of United States intellectual
property owners by enabling them to better protect and enforce their
intellectual property rights abroad. By opening a conspicuous gap in
the U.S. intellectual property scheme based on a distinctively
259. See Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 810 (1990); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989);
BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1090 (1989); Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
260. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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American justification, the Supreme Court's Florida Prepaid deci-
sions jeopardize this progress. State sovereign immunity from the
enforcement of federal intellectual property rights arguably violates
U.S. obligations under the TRIPs, NAFTA, and WIPO Copyright
Treaty agreements. Moreover, the United States has threatened and
imposed trade sanctions against other nations for gaps in their do-
mestic intellectual property regimes that, at least in their literal terms,
are less open-ended than immunity in national courts for intellectual
property violations by states and state entities.
Although state sovereign immunity for violations of federal in-
tellectual property rights is likely to be of only symbolic and not sub-
stantive importance in the United States, such subtleties are easily
overlooked in the international sphere. The fact that the Supreme
Court ruled that Congress lacks authority under the U.S. Constitution
to abrogate this immunity fuels the potential for mischaracterization
and exaggeration of this gap in international diplomacy circles. In
nations in which states and state enterprises play a more direct role in
the economy, this type of gap in the intellectual property system
could subvert the interests of intellectual property owners. Accord-
ingly, the credibility of the United States in preventing and combat-
ing international intellectual property piracy could suffer as a result
of the Florida Prepaid decisions. To the extent that the United
States is hindered or delayed in achieving its goal of universal pro-
tection and effective enforcement of intellectual property rights,
United States intellectual property owners will suffer a significant
loss in their revenue stream, which, in turn, will reduce the incentives
for engaging in creative enterprise. These international concerns
provide an alternative basis for congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity for infringement of federal intellectual property
rights.
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